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**TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: WILL THE
PARADIGM SHIFT?**

by

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December 1996

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TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: WILL THE PARADIGM SHIFT?

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ABSTRACT

Turkey seeks to become a full partner in the "European club" by joining the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU) in addition to her current membership in NATO. This has not happened despite a long and intensive effort by Turkey to be accepted, nor will it happen in the foreseeable future. The advantages Turkish membership would bring are outweighed by EU concerns about foreign, economic and domestic policy. Most significant among these are increased exposure to Greek-Turkish issues, Turkish economic strength in areas of little interest to Europe, and an exploding population which is expected to surpass Germany's by 2010. Europeans also question Turkey's democratic tradition, her human rights record and more recently, her secularization. Non-admission, combined with the demise of the Soviet Union, has caused Turkey to begin acting as her own foreign policy center. The result is a shifting paradigm in Turkish foreign relations which often sees Turkish initiatives at odds with those of her post-WWII traditional allies. This Turkish trend toward unilateralism will continue at least as long she is excluded from the EU and WEU and may, in fact, have developed its own momentum. This must be clearly understood to prevent mutual estrangement as Turkey takes initiatives (such as the recent advances to Iran and Libya) which are unpopular with her American and European allies.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Motherland Party
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Consortium
CofE or CE	Council of Europe
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces Europe agreement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHP	Republican People's Party
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (precursor to OSCE)
CU	Customs Union
DRA	Directorate of Religious Affairs (in Turkey)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Turkey)
DYP	True Path Party
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EEC	European Economic Community (precursor to EU)
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
FAWEU	Forces available to the Western European Union
FBIS	Federal Broadcasting Information Service
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HADEP	Peoples' Democratic Party
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKK	Kurdistan People's Party
RP	Welfare Party (Turkey)
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TRT	Turkish Radio Television network
TÜSİAD	Turkish Businessman's and Industrialist's Association
WEU	Western European Union

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Full Turkish integration into the two most important purely European political and security structures has progressed slowly despite the stated goal of Turkey to become a full member of the European Union (EU) in 1963 and the Western European Union (WEU) in 1987. While the nations of eastern Europe have only been able to aspire to EU membership since 1991, Turkey submitted her formal application in 1987 after a history of close cooperation beginning with the Cold War. Despite this, it appears that her bid to enter the EU and WEU as a full member will be eclipsed by at least three former east bloc nations--Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary and possibly by Malta and Cyprus before she perhaps is finally admitted.

The reasons for this slowness are multiple and are related to the complex situation in which Turkey finds herself as well as to a strong tendency towards risk avoidance by the EU member nations. The main reasons for not allowing Turkey full membership hinge upon issues such as poor Greek-Turkish relations, alleged human rights infractions in dealing with terrorism, and economic competitiveness and population growth. Underlying these very real issues, and much harder to document, may be an element of "Europeanism" which tacitly acknowledges Turkey as an outsider not fully within the European tradition. Although this "Europeanism" appears insufficient to stop Turkish accession to the EU and WEU, it may be a factor in causing European leaders to look more closely at the very tangible obstacles to Turkish integration into the EU and WEU which has ramifications for European and American foreign policy.

Europeans and Turks may ask why Turkish entrance into the EU and WEU may be important in the first place. The primary reason is stability--within Turkey, the regions surrounding Turkey and even Europe itself. Although Europeans do not overwhelmingly espouse Turkish membership in their most important organizations, they almost universally believe that regional stability, broadly defined to include all of the Eurasian land mass (and Africa), is a vital interest. Exporting stability to Turkey and her neighbors is commonly cited as a major benefit of allowing Turkey into the EU and the WEU. Europeans know this but they do not, from a Turkish perspective, seem to realize that failure to say "yes" to accession often enough begins to sound like "no."

The political and economic consequences for Europe of not allowing Turkey full EU and WEU membership over the near term (5-10 years) are probably quite low. Over the medium and long term adherence to the status quo of having Turkey near, but not in, involves increased risk to Turkish and possibly European stability unless European and Turkish leaders take appropriate actions to accommodate a situation different from each polities' stated goal of membership.

Many European leaders fail to realize is that their 'near term' is Turkey's 'present.' European leaders are still behaving as if bipolar assumptions remain valid--most importantly that Turkey will remain relatively cooperative and supportive regardless of European complacency. The reality is that two key events serve to modify this assumption--the end of the Cold War, and the beginning of the Second Gulf War. Prior to the Second Gulf War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey did not have a great deal of latitude with respect to choosing her allies. The Second Gulf War and the

reluctance of NATO's European allies to honor, without reservation, their Article 5 guarantees indicated to Turkish leaders that they should consider looking further for security guarantees. The end of the Soviet Union enabled them to do this. The result is that since 1991, Turkey has been much more willing to develop her foreign policy independent of Europe.

Europeans do not seem to realize that Turkey is, in fact, following a different paradigm of relations since they remain focused on the appearances of closer ties than the 1 January 1996 Customs Union (CU) engender. Additionally, the change in the paradigm may not be important now because a true European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is still in the future, hence Turkish membership in NATO is sufficient to meet European security needs--with the comfortable knowledge that the United States is also there should there be a situation involving Turkey.

A Turkey partially outside of the EU and the WEU is not necessarily a bad thing so long as both polities know where they stand. The current European policy, though, of ambiguity is perceived by Turks as unfair and ultimately may prove harmful to both Turks and EU members alike. Europe is still taking Turkey for granted based on a 'business as usual' approach. Turkey appears to be exploring other options while keeping the European door as fully open as possible. The EU and WEU members need to realize that there has been a change in Turkish-European relations and that a more profound one could be in the future if Europe does not make her position clear. Essentially, the EU and WEU should either tell Turkey that they only want ties that are as close as possible short

of full membership, or they should clearly link the milestones that are included in the CU treaty to future EU and subsequent WEU membership.

Europeans currently enjoy an unlikely situation. Through CU, they have excellent access to the benefits of Turkish EU membership without the responsibility, and through NATO they enjoy an equivalent relationship with the WEU. This state is probably not sustainable as Turkish leaders seek clarification or face the specter of repudiation at home for failure to reach closure. The paradigm of Turkish-European relations has already changed once and it seems likely it will shift again--the question is one of 'when' rather than 'if.'

Europeans (and Americans) should not expect to be as fortunate when the next shift in Turkish foreign policy occurs. The time to act is now and if Europeans are unwilling to clarify their position on Turkish integration into the EU and WEU, then the United States should be willing to put pressure on the Europeans to do so.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THESIS STATEMENT

Full Turkish integration into the two most important purely European political and security structures has progressed slowly despite the stated goal of Turkey to become a full member of the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU).¹ While the nations of eastern Europe have only been able to aspire to EU membership since 1991, Turkey submitted her formal application in 1987 after a history of close cooperation beginning with the Cold War. Despite this, it appears that her bid to enter the EU and WEU as a full member will be eclipsed by at least three former east bloc nations—Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary and possibly by Malta and Cyprus before she perhaps is finally admitted.² The reasons for this slowness are multiple and are related to the complex situation in which Turkey finds herself as well as to a strong tendency towards risk avoidance by the EU member nations. Very broadly, the primary public reasons delaying Turkey's admission to these two key European institutions are issues of economics, foreign policy and the democratic tradition. Underlying these very real issues, and much harder to document, may be an element of "Europeanism" which tacitly acknowledges Turkey as an outsider not fully within the European tradition.³ Although

¹ Ziya Öniş, "Turkey In The Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity," Middle East Journal, (Volume 49, No. 1, Winter 1995), p. 53.

² "EU-Sondergipfel bekräftigt Ziele und Zeitplan für die Reform der Europäischen Union," Deutschland Nachrichten, (11 October 1996), p. 1.

³ An investigation of the Index To International Public Opinion surveys compiled from 1987 to 1993 indicates that Turkey has a definite perception problem among "average" European civilians. This perception problem appears to stem from two issues: a lack of knowledge of Turks and Turkey and at least some level of prejudice against Turks. These surveys, which are included in Appendix B, will be addressed in greater detail throughout this paper. Nowhere in my research, have I found any significant evidence suggesting a public bias against Turkey and Turks among Europe's senior leaders.

this "Europeanism" appears insufficient to stop Turkish accession to the EU and WEU, it may be a factor in causing European leaders to look more closely at the very tangible obstacles to Turkish integration into the EU and WEU. Regardless of whether or not differences in culture and religion play a significant role in keeping Turkey out, the impediments engendered over issues such as poor Greek-Turkish relations, alleged human rights infractions in dealing with terrorism, and economic competitiveness and population growth appear more than sufficient to ensure that Turkey does not become a full member of the EU or WEU within the next decade at least--and probably much longer than that.

Based on non-admission to the European club, Turkey may be forced to reconsider her foreign policy options. In particular, it may make sense to her, especially with the end of bipolarism, to modify her Cold War foreign policy paradigm and act significantly more independently of her traditional European and North American allies. This has the potential to increase political and economic competitiveness with Europe and the United States and possibly to lead to fallings-out as Turkey takes actions contrary to her allies' wishes.

This, in fact, seems to be the current case in Turkish politics although the present example of Prime Minister Erbakan and his Welfare Party is an extreme example. A much more moderate approach to Turkey's need to consider her foreign and domestic policy formulation separately from European and American leads is Ziya Öniş who believes that "Turkey should come to terms with the fact that its heritage draws from both the East and the West. [sic] . . . Turkey possesses a broader identity that extends beyond a purely European one. This broader identity should be considered an asset rather than a weakness

or disadvantage.”⁴ To him, Turkey should choose when to act as her own geopolitical center independent of Europe and when to act in concert with Europe on issues such as economics, terrorism and foreign policy.

An understanding of Turkey’s snail-pace integration into European organizations and institutions not only affects European and Turkish policy makers but is important to American foreign policy makers as well. Without an understanding of Turkish and European issues concerning Turkey’s desire to formally become Europe’s southeastern border, American foreign policy makers run the risk of developing a flawed policy that does not fully mesh with that of either Europe or Turkey in the Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia and which could cause difficulties in American dealings with Turkey.⁵ It is probably true that American security and political interests in Turkey resemble Europe’s more than they differ, but it is also true that there is an “Atlantic filter” which affords the United States greater flexibility than Europe when dealing with Turkey. This filter enables the United States to distance herself from European concerns regarding Turkish immigrant problems as well as cultural and religious differences. Distance, combined with a strong post-World War II history of friendship during the Cold War and

⁴ Öniş, pp. 48-49.

⁵ Recent examples of a lack of American understanding of Turkey’s situation with respect to Europe with a negative impact on American foreign policy include Germany’s clear reluctance to support Turkey as a NATO ally against Iraq in the Second Gulf War and Turkey’s more recent look to America’s enemies, notably Iran and Libya, as trading partners. In early May 1995, under Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, Turkey signed a 23-year natural gas agreement with Iran indicating that Turkish independence of American desires is not dependent upon who has the governmental lead in Turkey. From Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995,” Middle East Journal, (Volume 50, No. 3, Summer 1996), pp. 354-355.

Second Gulf War, allows America to be perhaps more objective in her dealings with Turkey vis-à-vis her European friends.⁶

B. OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT

1. Relevance

Europe is at a crossroads between nationalism and supra-nationalism as it enters the 21st century. If Europe is to become something greater than the sum of its parts, it must collectively decide how to define itself as well as to define its interests. Even before the Turin Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) which began on March 29, 1996, EU member nations were displaying stress as they came to grips with diverse national interests in plotting EU strategy into the next century. The ultimate question the European nations must answer is what will be the future pattern of European Union growth as well as that of closely related organizations such as the WEU.⁷

Growth of the EU can take two broad directions.⁸ The first of these is "deepening," meaning that the EU would establish a moratorium on accepting new full members into its polity. The second is "widening," which means accepting new full members as soon as they meet certain minimum standards of economic, political, military

⁶ The "First Gulf War" was the eight year Iran-Iraq war over their international land borders as well as the Shatt al Arab waterway which ended in 1990. The Second Gulf War was the American-led coalition which restored Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991.

⁷"Resolution on (i) Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference; and (ii) evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference" based on the Dury/Maij-Weggen report (A4-0068/96), Internet address: <http://www.cec.lu/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/parlment/opinion.html>, (13 March 1996). This article contains a summary of the IGC points finally "agreed" upon.

⁸ There are numerous books and articles describing the progression of European unity. Two references on this are: John Pinder, European Community, The Building of a Union, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) and George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

and human rights performance.⁹ There is a middle ground answer as well which is actually a subcategory of widening—that is to simultaneously accept new members as they are ready while attempting to strengthen bonds among the “core” members.¹⁰ All three concepts have their adherents and positive aspects; however, the goal of this thesis is not to analyze their merits, but rather to examine the issue of EU and WEU growth with respect to one of the most controversial accessions—Turkey.

In many ways, Turkey faces a future policy situation very similar to that of Europe. Specifically, she must decide if her interests will best be served by “going it alone” (deepening), finding other allies (widening), or maintaining separate, but friendly relations with the EU while remaining separate from that polity (a subcategory of widening). Just as in the EU viewpoint, there is more at stake than simple economic, political and security concerns.¹¹

Turkey, like the EU, must also ensure union is compatible with her 21st century interests which are at least as controversial for Turks as for Europeans. Many analysts refer to Turkey as a “bridge” nation—superficially due to its geographical location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East—but more importantly because of her

⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad, ed., Strategic Appraisal 1996, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996) has a concise summary of the widening versus deepening debate in Ronald D. Asmus’ chapter, “Western Europe,” especially pp. 54-60.

¹⁰ Daily Support Annex, West Europe, (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1 April 1996). Various articles from this issue demonstrate the debate. See “EU ‘Heads of Government Accept Principle of Flexibility’” [Rome Radio], p. 9; “EU: Spain’s Gonzales Expects No Changes in EU Policy [Madrid Radio], p. 9; and “Sweden: Analysts Fear Growing Reluctance on EU Enlargement”, p. 18. See also “Une interview du ministre des Affaires européennes, Michel Barnier: <<Il ne faut surtout pas construire deux Europe>>”, Le Figaro, (11 January 1996). Numerous other references from all European countries are available.

¹¹ See Öniş, pp. 48-68.

mixed cultural heritage.¹² Ultimately, Turkey, like Europe, must choose which one of three major paths to follow into the future although the stakes are proportionately higher as they have strong implications for Turkish economics, security and culture. Turkey, then, must decide whether she will look north towards Europe, outwards to the Middle East, the Caucasus, Transcaucus and Central Asia, or inwards for her *Weltanschauung*.

2. Methodology & Realism

a. *Levels of Analysis—Realism*

Realism is often associated with power politics as espoused by such notables as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. Typically, realism looks at differences and conflict points more than at reasons for peaceful coexistence. There is, however, a subcategory of realism which logically follows from the realists' prisoner's dilemma. Essentially it boils down to "democracies do not fight one another" although this statement is rather more specific than it should be. Perhaps a better restatement is that "mainstream countries do not fight one another."¹³ Rephrasing the concept this way makes it unnecessary to unequivocally state that Turkey is a democracy—a question many Europeans have and which will be addressed later in this thesis (see Appendix B, Table

¹² Examples of references to Turkey as a "bridge" nation include Ian O. Lesser's essay "Bridge or Barrier" in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 99; Heinz Kramer, "Die Türkei als Regionalmacht, Brücke und Modell: Strategisch-politische Zerr- und Wunschkörper deutscher und westlicher Türkeipolitik," sponsored by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, (Ebenhausen, BRD: August 1995); Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No. 2), p. 39 and it is one of the essential assumptions of Öniş' article.

¹³ Of course, an exception that readily comes to mind given this topic is Turkey and Greece, but even these two traditional enemies have found a way to at least partially work around their differences short of major war. The 1974 Cyprus War did not escalate further, largely due to a tacit understanding by both nations that it was not in their best interests to do so (Greece because she was faced with a *fait accompli* and Turkey because she had gained her immediate objectives with overwhelming military force).

14c). The result is that not only do Turkey and Europe not see themselves as traditional power competitors, but that they see themselves as allies in a prisoners' dilemma.

Levels of analysis have also evolved significantly Hans Morgenthau simplistically described "power" in terms of eight defining characteristics or Kenneth Waltz thought of international relations interaction being based solely on a Holy Grail search for security.¹⁴ Several modern realists seem to understand the issues in more relative terms. For Samuel Huntington, conflict is about hegemonic economics and cultural groupings.¹⁵ For Christopher Layne, it is about minimal realism—an economic *realpolitik*.¹⁶ And for William C. Wohlforth, it is about levels of analysis—the politicians, the state and the international system.¹⁷ Extracting key points from these noted international relations theorists enables one to conduct an inquiry that is thorough and unbiased towards the EU, WEU and Turkish entrance as a full member to these organizations.

Based on modern realist literature, this thesis examines the laggard pace of Turkish integration from the three primary realist perspectives named above. This ensures that no significant interaction point between Europe and Turkey concerning economic,

¹⁴ Morgenthau as cited in Richard N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism", International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, (New York, 1995), p. 28. The eight characteristics are: size, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character, morale and the quality of diplomacy and government. Waltz from Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹⁵ Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," from The Cold War and After, pp. 307-322 and "The Clash of Civilizations," from Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993).

¹⁶ Christopher Layne, "Less is More", The National Interest, (Spring 1996).

¹⁷ William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," from Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, (Cambridge, Mass, 1995).

political and security union is discounted out of hand. Additionally, modern realism provides a framework for impugning significant trends in the absence of complete evidence such as in some aspects of security and cultural analysis. Perhaps the most important framework of this analysis will be modeled on the realism of William C. Wohlforth¹⁸ which allows one to examine the following three components of modern foreign policy decision making:

1. The international system (international organizations, treaties, agreements, protocols, etc., as well as the anarchical component).
2. The state (its politics, culture, economics, etc.).
3. The leaders (whose decisions ultimately influence and determine domestic and foreign policy, sometimes irrespective of "common sense").

b. Assumptions and Sources

Primary sources for this thesis include citations from Lexis/Nexis, FBIS and Internet search engines with Boolean search phrases.¹⁹ These searches yielded approximately 2500 pages of articles with significant references to at least one polity as it pertains to the other. A limitation of electronic media sources is that the greatest density of this information dates from less than five years ago although there are references which are older, especially treaties, significant agreements and protocols, constitutions and major policy speeches and decisions. A basic assumption of this thesis, then, is that electronic media sources, even though generally limited to the past five years, provide a legitimate basis for identifying and discussing the reasons behind Turkey's slow progress towards EU and WEU membership when they are combined with more scholarly studies. Other

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The core search phases were "Turkey and EU" and "Turkey and WEU." Due to the extremely large amount of information on electronic sources, limiters also had to be used for specific areas. Examples include "Turkey and EU and Black Sea" and "Turkey and WEU and Gulf War," etc.

sources used include books on Turkey, on Europe and on European Institutions. Also used were feature-length articles as well as some references on parallel topics such as *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*.²⁰ Additionally, polling data from the *Index to International Public Opinion*²¹ was used to examine issues of cultural bias of Europeans towards Turkey.

C. EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

There is a number of European political and military institutions which are important to Turkey. Primary among these are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), North Atlantic cooperation Council (NACC), Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE--formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--CSCE), the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe (CofE or CE)²². The first three of these organizations are NATO-related and are important to Turkey as a manifestation of her membership in the Western club as well as for the security guarantees they extend to her.

The other three polities are “purely European”; of the three, the EU and WEU interact most often with the United States. The WEU as the “European pillar” of NATO shares an especially close relationship which is still developing.²³ Currently the EU does

²⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, after 1990). Although this book only deals peripherally with Turkey, the analysis it provides of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese entrance to the EU is a useful framework for understanding Turkey's situation less the cultural impact of Islam.

²¹ Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, editors, Index to International Public Opinion, various years 1987 to 1993, (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press).

²² Turkey is a full member of all but the EU and WEU. A complete list of international organizations of which Turkey is member is included in Appendix A.

²³ The WEU's origins are with the 1948 Brussels Treaty. In 1954 it was refounded in its modern form with the signing of the Paris Agreements. During most of the Cold War it was not a major military

not have a security component, but as the largest economic organization in the world, EU policies carry significant foreign policy clout as well. Additionally, under Maastricht, there is a provision for the EU to develop a CFSP as its “second pillar.” One possibility is that WEU would become the basis for this when the founding Brussels Treaty of 1948 comes up for review in 1998. The CofE, while significant as a political statement, is not particularly powerful in deed. Additionally, Turkey already has what she wants from this organization--full membership since its 1949 founding (although she was temporarily expelled following the 1980 military coup).²⁴

Lack of full membership in the EU and WEU remains sore points for Turkey. In the EU, Turkey has only associate member status including Customs Union (CU) (to be addressed later) and in the WEU, she is also an associate member. In both organizations, associate status places limits on Turkish voice and influence in Europe as well as at home and among her neighboring states--most notably the right to vote on issues deemed important to her. Turkey’s relationship with the WEU is perhaps the more difficult to understand due to implied constraints concerning the WEU.²⁵ For example, all WEU

or political player until 1984 when European interests in creating and strengthening an European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as part NATO’s European pillar were reawakened. The move to a greater integrated European security identity was further enhanced in 1987 with the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the member countries development of a platform outlining the WEU’s role within NATO and Europe. During the European Council meeting at Maastrict in 1991, it was further decided to enhance the WEU by expanding it, defining its role as the future arm of an integrated ESDI and further clarifying its relationship with NATO culminating with the 19 June 1992 Petersberg Declaration when these goals (all of which are being reviewed as part of the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) and which were officially sanctioned by the January 1994 NATO Summit meeting). NATO Handbook, (Brussels, 1995), pp. 196-203.

²⁴ Greece was expelled in 1967 for the same reason, Lawrence Whitehead in “International Aspects of Democratization,” from O’Donnell, p. 20.

²⁵ The EU and WEU are two completely separate organizations despite a lay misperception that the WEU is subordinate to the EU. Under Maastricht, there is a provision for the EU to eventually develop a common foreign and security policy and it is possible that the basis for this would be the present WEU (the WEU Treaty is up for review in 1998). This is, however, not stated anywhere formally and no

member nations are also NATO members and EU members. This is not meant to imply that membership in the EU and NATO provides automatic admission to the WEU, rather it shows a convergence of interests that seems to be self justifying although unintentional at first.²⁶ Turkey's hope appears to be that full membership in these two organizations will increase domestic and international prestige, better position her economically and deepen her western security guarantees.²⁷

D. HISTORY OF EUROPEAN-TURKISH RELATIONS

To better understand modern Turkish-European relations and the roots of some modern prejudices from both a European and Turkish viewpoint, a look at their mutual history is in order. Even today, Turkish-European relations remain somewhat tainted by the economic and military competition of a rising and then declining Ottoman Empire vis-

decision is likely until the results of the present IGC are announced in 1997. Additionally, the WEU is not nearly as cohesive as NATO and, unlike NATO, it has no organic forces of its own although units such as the European Corps (in which Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium participate), NATO multinational division central (in which Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany participate) and the UK-Netherlands amphibious force are Forces Available to the Western European Union (FAWEU). From Mathias Jopp, "The Strategic Implications of European Integration," Adelphi Paper 290, (London: Brassey's Ltd. for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1994), p. 28. This article also provides an in-depth overview of the all major issues related to the EU, WEU and their respective enlargements.

²⁶ Rationalization began as the outgrowth of the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis and was formalized by the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994. From the NATO Handbook. It is interesting to note that several of the former East Bloc states want EU membership because with it they believe that they would have a better chance at gaining admission to the WEU. Membership in the WEU would mean de facto NATO membership since the interrelatedness of the Atlantic Treaty and the WEU Treaty effectively extends the military guarantees of one organization to the other. More significantly, WEU mutual defense guarantees under its Article 5 are more strongly stated than NATO's Article 5 (for the wording of Article 5 guarantees, see footnote 107).

²⁷Turkey's perceived threats have changed greatly since the end of the Cold War and Russia is no longer the all encompassing enemy she was. Current primary security issues include international terrorism, riparian rights issues with Syria and Iraq, and problems in the Caucasus especially with Armenia and the threatened development and employment of weapons of mass destruction by Iran, Iraq and Syria. Evidence of European and NATO recognition of Turkish security issues along her southern border are obvious when one looks at a map delineating forces under CFE. On such a map, a line runs roughly through the east-west axis of Turkey. Forces to the north of this line fall under CFE guidelines, those to the south do not.

à-vis the West European states during the last 400 years. In the European mind is the memory of the Ottoman invasions of Europe which were finally ended with Sultan Mustafa II's defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683.²⁸ As well, they recall that this was not merely a war of expansion, but also a war between different civilizations. Had Sultan Mustafa II won, it is very likely that European civilization as it exists today would have been radically different despite relatively high Ottoman tolerance for other religions and cultures.²⁹

From a Turkish viewpoint, they remember the rather shabby treatment they received at European hands, especially economic, as the "sick man of Europe" during the 19th and early 20th centuries.³⁰ Even today, a significant minority of Turks still fears European economic domination without benefit to them, especially since this minority perceives it as the advance wedge of westernization that will ultimately override that

²⁸ Vienna was unsuccessfully besieged in 1529 by Suleyman the Magnificent who did succeed in capturing European territory as far as Belgrade (1521) and Budapest (1526). His successors subsequently captured Crete and territory in the Ukraine and threatened Vienna again in 1664 before being defeated by King Sobieski of Poland in 1683 outside Vienna. From Helen Chapin Metz, Turkey: A Country Study, (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 20-22.

²⁹ A dynamic historical novel covering a portion of the Ottoman invasions and their interaction with European culture on the Balkan peninsula is the Nobel Prize for Literature winner The Bridge on the River Drina by Ivo Andric (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977). This book indicates that tolerance was a product of a static empire. During the expansionistic phase, the Ottomans aggressively encouraged the conversion of Christians to Islam through multiple forms of coercion such as economic sanctions and withholding of political office. Children, as part of treaty arrangements on tribute, were also kidnapped to serve the Sultan and part of their new life included conversion to Islam. The Ottoman legacy in this region remains extremely important even today as the EU and WEU grapple with the Yugoslav crisis which, although attributable to many factors in Balkan history to include the effects of the Russian and Habsburg Empires, has also been exacerbated by the religious schism begun in Ottoman times. An excellent historical text on the minorities in the Ottoman era is Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey, A Modern History, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 11-172.

³⁰ It was Czar Nicholas I who first used this phrase with respect to the "Eastern question" as a description of how the European powers should divide up Ottoman territory so that none of them gained a decisive advantage in territory, population and wealth which would upset the balance of power in the 19th century.

which gives the Turk his national character--perhaps most importantly his religion, but also their very distinct and proud history.³¹

The early 20th century was a difficult time for what became modern-day Turkey as Europeans (Germany) pulled the Ottoman Empire into the First World War and other Europeans (the Allies) invaded her as the beginning of the end of the Ottomans. By war's end an exhausted Ottoman Empire expected to be completely broken up for its place on the losing side as well as for the atrocities and suffering it instigated on the Armenians.³² Were it not for the efforts of the Turkish Nationalists led by Pasha Kemal Atatürk in 1919, the allied-sanctioned Greek invasion of modern-day Turkey might have succeeded in destroying even the Ottoman rump.³³ Instead, Turkish victory over the Greeks set up the conditions for the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in which Turkey was the only defeated World War I power to participate as an equal to the victors.³⁴

In the years between the two world wars, Turkish-European relations consisted primarily of normalization of relations, while Turkey under Atatürk aggressively recreated

³¹ The primary group who feels this way are the fundamentally oriented Welfare Party and its adherents who won the greatest percentage of votes in the 24 December 1995 election (21.3%--Sami Kohen, "Islamic Party Win Worsens Turkey's East vs. West Woes," The Christian Science Monitor, (27 December 1995). Obviously 21 percent is not a mandate or a consensus and, as is usual in Turkish politics, is not nearly so clear as politicians might make it appear since politicians often say something other than one they believe in order to garner support. Graham E. Fuller hints at this in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China by Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 171. An Asahi New Service article, "Don't Jump To Conclusions on Effect of Turkish Vote," from Lexis/Nexis (27 December 1995) states "what Turkish voters supported may have been not so much its fundamentalist tone, but its low-profile welfare efforts." Indeed it is the disenfranchised and disillusioned who are not recipients of any economic trickle-down effect who are most against closer ties to the west and the European Union as stated by Ertugrul Kürkçü in "The Crisis of the Turkish State," from Middle East Report, (Spring 1996), pp. 2-4.

³² Metz, p. 30-31. Estimates of Armenian dead vary from 600,000 to over 1,000,000 with both Turks and Kurds carrying out the massacres.

³³ Metz, p. 34.

³⁴ Metz, p. 35.

herself as a secular state using the west as a model while simultaneously trying to avoid the international entanglements which ultimately brought almost all of Europe to war by 1941. During World War II, Turkey managed to keep herself neutral, scrupulously enforcing the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits although she did sign pacts with both Allied and Axis powers. Finally, in February 1945, she declared war on Germany as a precondition for joining the future United Nations (UN).³⁵

After World War II, Turkish ties to the United States and Europe strengthened as Russia began to restate old claims against Turkish territory, particularly in the Turkish Straits as part of a broader strategy of improving her access to the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Soviet aggressive policy had the result of causing the United States to put forth the Truman Doctrine which guaranteed the security of Turkey and Greece (1947). In 1950, Turkey sent an infantry brigade to Korea which greatly enhanced her bid for full NATO membership which was granted simultaneously to Greece and Turkey in 1952 and which served to unequivocally bring Turkey into the European orbit.

Turkey's formal relations with the EU began on 31 July 1959 when she applied for European Economic Community (EEC) membership. Associate member status was quickly granted on 11 September of the same year.³⁶ On 12 September 1963, Turkey signed the "Ankara Agreement" which was to take Turkey into Customs Union (CU) and ultimately to full EEC membership but no time line was given. Customs Union finally

³⁵ Metx, p. 40. Other nations neutral which declared war in the last days of the World War II include Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland as well as many South American nations.

³⁶ As a point of comparison, Greece applied 8 June, 1959 and was granted full EU membership on 1 January 1981. "Turkey-EU Relations Calendar," <http://www.turkey.or/news/0216po17.htm> (29 May 1996) and "Chronology of the Union," <http://www.cec.lu/en/chron/chron.html> (21 May 1996).

happened on 1 January 1996, but EU membership languishes as the EU looks to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) for its new members rather than deal with the economic, political, foreign policy and humanitarian issues Turkish EU membership would engender.

In April 1987, Turkey applied for membership in the Western European Union and, as in the case with EU membership, it appeared no significant progress would be made for the foreseeable future.³⁷ The status quo might have continued had there not been a rationalization of WEU membership in 1991 which allowed NATO members who were not EU members to become Associate Members of the WEU as part of the means to “reinforce the ‘European Pillar of the Alliance’.”³⁸ This means that Turkey is allowed to participate in WEU issues and operations unless “a majority of the Full Members decides otherwise.”³⁹ Turkey does not agree with the principle of Associate Member status because she believes that there is not a legal basis for it in the 1948 Brussels Treaty, but as an outsider, she has little choice but to voice objections and make do.⁴⁰

One European organization in which Turkey has had full membership for an extended period of time is the Council of Europe of which Turkey was a founding member in 1949.⁴¹ This organization whose goal is the promotion of democracy, stability and human rights among its member nations has had a tumultuous relationship with Turkey

³⁷ “European Security and Defense Identity and Turkey,” [Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/secure.htm), <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/secure.htm> (as of 18 November 1996).

³⁸ Ibid. The other Associate Members of the WEU include Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway.

³⁹ “Western European Union: Membership,” <http://www.fco.gov.uk/weu/membership.html> (as of 21 May 1996).

⁴⁰ “European Security and Defense . . .” Mathias Jopp, “The Strategic Implications of European Integration,” [Adelphi Paper 290](#), (London: Brassey’s Ltd. for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1994), p. 28, also says Associate Member status does not have a treaty basis although he does not specifically refer to Turkey in this context.

⁴¹ Metz, p. xxxii and [World](#), p. 489.

having observed three Turkish military coups (1960, 1971 and 1980) for which Turkish membership was suspended in 1982.⁴² Nonetheless, Turkey's leaders continue to affirm the goals of the CofE, to encourage its use as a dialogue forum, especially for international terrorism issues, and to support its enlargement to the nations surrounding Turkey (apparently including even Russia).⁴³ Turkey's latest success towards European integration is the much-hailed Customs Union (CU) of 1 January 1996 for which Turkey received congratulations from all major European powers plus the United States.⁴⁴ Other major European oriented organizations of which Turkey is a member include the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CofE or CE), and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).⁴⁵

E. THE ISSUES

It is an unfortunately true cliché that Turkey indeed "lives in a rough neighborhood."⁴⁶ It is also geopolitically true that, as Dean Acheson is alleged to have said, "Turkey doesn't cover much, but what she does cover is absolutely vital." Hence, as much as Europe would prefer to distance herself from Turkey's foreign policy problems, Europeans also understand that they cannot afford to abrogate their interests and access to

⁴² Metz, p. 256.

⁴³ "Turkey in the Council of Europe," from Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/mfa471.htm> (as of 18 May 1996).

⁴⁴ "Customs Union Vote Anchors Turkey in the West", Turkey Today, (No. 153, November/December 1995), p. 1; and "Congratulations," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, <http://www.turkey.org/news/0216po18.htm>, (29 May 1996). Congratulations were sent by President Jacques Chirac of France, US State Department Spokesman Gwyn Davies, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and British Prime Minister John Major.

⁴⁵ For a complete list of organizations of which Turkey is a member, see Appendix A.

⁴⁶ Thomas Friedman, in "Pay Attention as Turkey Seeks Its Way in a Rough Neighborhood," International Herald Tribune from Lexis/Nexis (18 May 1996) also refers to Turkey as being in a "bad neighborhood."

the areas surrounding Turkey. Likewise for Turkey continued contact with Europe is vital. Not only is Europe by far Turkey's largest trading partner, but she is the only major geopolitical area that does not represent a military threat to Turks.⁴⁷ For reasons of economic and strategic necessity, then, Turkey and Europe must maintain close contact with one another, the question is to what degree.

The issues surrounding the pros and cons of Turkish membership in the EU can be broken down to four major points: (1) differences in religion and culture; (2) governmental--perceived weaknesses in Turkey's democratic tradition, application of the rule of law and adherence to human rights accords, especially with respect to the Kurds; (3) CFSP concerns, particularly poor Greek-Turkish relations; (4) economic concerns over competitiveness and population growth as well as access to other markets.⁴⁸

1. Differences in Religion and Culture

The original premise of this thesis was that prejudice due to differences in Turkish and European cultures on the model of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" was the primary factor preventing Turkish entrance into the EU and WEU. Research, however, has failed to support this view. In thousands of pages of news releases and analysis, no main-stream European leader has publicly indicated any cultural bias against the Turks as

⁴⁷ Turkey conducts over 50% of her foreign trade with Europe with the Middle East being second in importance. Öniş, p. 56.

⁴⁸ Mükerrem Hiç, Turkey's Customs Union with the European Union, sponsored by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, (Ebenhausen, Germany: September 1995) contains a brief analysis of all but the cultural and population growth aspects.

grounds for non-admission of Turkey into either the EU or WEU and only one key

Turkish leader has--and he is on the far right of the Turkish political spectrum.⁴⁹

There is, however, evidence to suggest that average Europeans have a poor opinion of Turks and are generally unfavorable to Turkish accession to the EU. In a poll conducted in 1990, EU citizens almost universally gave Turks the lowest "trust" rating of 25 nationalities including countries in the EU, CEE, Asia and North America (Appendix B, Table 16). When EU citizens were asked in 1992 "which countries do you think should be part of the European Community in the year 2000?" Turkey did much better--turning in roughly the same performance figures as the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Estonia, doing somewhat better than Russia or Slovakia and somewhat worse than Poland, Malta and Hungary (Appendix B, Table 17). However in a much less comprehensive poll done in 1993, Turkey finished at the bottom of a list of nations considered for EU membership "in the near future" (Appendix B, Table 18).⁵⁰ These public opinion figures suggest that European political leaders have to at least consider the generally negative attitude of their constituencies. Hence cultural bias, while not a reason for non-admission, at best provides little incentive to push for Turkish accession.

By far the most prominent Turkish leader who believes in the separateness of Turkish and European cultures is Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party and current Turkish Prime Minister. When talking of the latest EU-Turkish success, the CU,

⁴⁹ When Necmettin Erbakan, current Turkish Prime Minister and leader of the Islamist "Welfare Party" was in the opposition, his party attacked the EU as a "Christian Club." From John Barham, "Set on the East-West Divide," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. I.

⁵⁰ This list comprised Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Malta, and Cyprus. No CEE countries were included.

he said, “We shall scrap the customs union with the European Union, which is a document of surrender and shame for Turkey.”⁵¹ But even he, when faced with the reality of increased responsibility as Prime Minister and the need to work within a coalition to maintain power, later back pedaled on this strong remark and in a joint statement issued with Tansu Ciller (the minority coalition party leader) said, “Policies that will encourage new employment opportunities, that will support small and medium-size installations, that will contribute to the development of developing regions, and that will ensure adjustment to the competition necessitated by the Customs Union will be implemented.”⁵² It is very important for both Europeans and the Turkish elite to remember that many Turks (especially the poor and less educated) appear to see modern-day secularization as one having, at best, only minimal benefits for them: “The conservatives in the center-right parties saw in secularism an ideology that undermined family and community ties, and led to the moral degeneration of youth, the weakening of spiritual values, and the spread of communism among alienated intellectuals--social ills that could only be cured by religion.”⁵³

There is another issue dealing with cultural identification which is unstated by all but the European ultra right and the extreme right and left of Turkey that can be thought of in terms of the question: Is Turkey a part of Western tradition or Eastern tradition?⁵⁴

⁵¹ Sami Kohen, “Islamic Party Win Worsens Turkey’s East vs. West Woes,” The Christian Science Monitor (27 December 1995).

⁵² “Turkey: Erbakan, Ciller News Conference on Coalition,” Ankara TRT Television Network, translation by FBIS, (29 June 1996, 0816 GMT). Equally important is that in over six months as Prime Minister, his government has “done nothing to sever ties with the west or scrap the customs union.” From Barham, p. I.

⁵³ Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, (Volume 50, Number 1, Winter 1996), p. 44.

⁵⁴ Mauther, p. IV.

The answer, if one definitively knew it to be “yes” or “no” would make the question of EU and WEU membership much easier to deal with since there would probably be a clear consensus by everyone involved of Turkey’s eventual status.⁵⁵ Instead the answer is ambiguous and perhaps was best expressed by Turkey’s former Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz when he said: “Europe is a state of mind, not an arbitrary line drawn down the Bosphorus”⁵⁶

Little did he know he actually may have spoken the mind of many of Europe’s leaders as well as that of the Turkish elite’s. European politicians seem to believe in their heart of hearts that Turkey does *not* belong in the European “state of mind,” at least when it comes down to taking a strong position in favor of Turkish admission.⁵⁷ Obviously no one wants to alienate a key ally and friendly nation so they cannot publicly say they do not want Turkey in the EU and WEU. Instead they must rely on “rationality” to determine

⁵⁵ In a public opinion poll conducted in Great Britain in November 1992, 46% of respondents said Turkey was part of Asia, 31% that Turkey was European and 23% did not know. (Appendix B, Table 11).

⁵⁶ Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War" in Turkey's New Geopolitics by Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), p. 105.

⁵⁷ In my research, I have found no mainstream European politician who has publicly stated reserve to Turkish admission to the EU based on a prejudicial attitude towards Turkey. Nonetheless I believe there is an element of reserve which while not means primary or even sufficient to preclude Turkish entrance to the EU and WEU, is a complicating factor. Samuel Huntington in “The Clash of Civilizations” certainly believes (perhaps overstates the case) that cultural separateness is important. Robert Mauther, a Diplomatic Correspondent with the EEC in “Misunderstandings Persist,” Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis (20 May 1985), p. IV voices the issues of Turkish “incompatibility” as perhaps being more important than the generally given rational explanations for the slow progress of Turkish accession to the EU and WEU. Other articles from the Financial Times that very broadly hint at a sense of cultural separateness being a factor in Turkish accession include: John Wyles, “Relations with the EEC Soured by Human Right Issue,” Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, (17 May 1983), Section IV, p. III; and Leslie Colitt, “Bitter Times for Workers Abroad,” from Lexis/Nexis, Financial Times Survey, (17 May 1982), Section III, p. X. Note, though, that these three articles were written in the period of rapprochement following the 1980 Turkish military coup. Thomas L. Friedman in “Pay Attention as Turkey Seeks Its Way in a Rough Neighborhood,” International Herald Tribune, (18 May 1995), is much stronger on the issue of European bias saying, “Many members of the European Parliament [sic] despise the Turks because they are Muslims . . .”

admission (or non-admission) of Turkey into the ranks of the EU and WEU.⁵⁸ Turkish leaders in the foreign ministry, at least, believe this as shown in a press release that said, in part, “It is well known that various quarters in Europe have been alarmed at Turkey’s entry into a customs union with the European Union and its subsequent aim of becoming a full EU member. These objections of these circles are ultimately based on a racist approach linked to the fact that Turkey possesses a different culture and religion. But [sic] they are unable to say this openly . . .”⁵⁹ A European writer in 1984, even before Turkey had submitted her formal application for membership in the EEC, states “The general view in Brussels, [sic] is that it would be better for everyone if Turkey maintained a proper regard for the Community but was a little less in love with the idea of belonging to it.”⁶⁰ In the near term, it appears to make little difference what Turkey wants since Greece steadfastly maintains a veto on packages beneficial to Turkey to include Turkish EU membership (a condition of WEU membership).⁶¹ If a proposal for majority voting instead of consensus voting is ratified, a topic to be addressed at the current IGC, then it is possible that all of Europe will have to grapple with the issue of full admission of Turkey without relying on a simple solution in a Greek veto.⁶²

⁵⁸ Mauther, Section III, p. IV. It is important to note that Mauther was writing before the end of the Cold War and that some of his assumptions concerning Turkish-European relations are no longer valid such as that Turkey and Europe must remain friendly due to the constraints of bipolar world.

⁵⁹ “Photographs and Article Published in *The European* Newspaper,” Turkish Foreign Ministry homepage on the Internet at <http://www/mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/0.htm>, (12 January 1996).

⁶⁰ John Wyles, “Relations with the EEC Soured by Human Right Issue,” Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, (17 May 1983), Section IV, p. III.

⁶¹ “Turkey: Foreign Minister Views Greek Impact on Ties with EU,” Ankara Turkish Daily News in English from FBIS (26 June 1996); “Greece: Politicians React to Turkey’s Claims on Island,” Athens News in English from FBIS, (6 June 1996), p. 3; and “Turkey: Yilmaz ‘Fails’ to Change Greek, EU Positions, Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (26 March 1996).

⁶² “Greece: Politicians React . . .,” p. 3. Of course it is possible that Greece would vote against majority voting just for this reason.

2. Democratic Tradition, Rule of Law and Human Rights

a. *Democratic Tradition*

Turkey's democratic tradition is based on the legacy left by her republican founding father, Pasha Kemal Atatürk. Today, his pro-western reforms serve as justification for calls for security and especially economic union of Turkey with the EU. To the religiously-oriented Turkish minority, however, movement westwards is the continuation of a negative secularization trend which began with increasing Western influence in the Ottoman Empire, brought about Ottoman destruction by the Western allies in the wake of World War I and which continues to haunt the modern Turkish state since its 1923 founding.⁶³ This is not a denunciation of Atatürk's legacy (almost universally Turks see him as a national hero to whom Turkey owes its modern existence); rather, they are uncomfortable with the numerous reforms begun by him and continued by his successors under the tutelage of the military. Further, there seems to be a duality to Turkish adherence to Kemalism and the contradictions Turkish society has with the legacy of its founder. The most extreme example of this duality derives from a study of Welfare Party voters which showed that "41% of those who voted for the Islamist Welfare (Refah) Party (RP) declared themselves laik (secular) which is a Kemalist identification."⁶⁴

Europeans may ask why this question of Atatürk is important, but it is highly telling to remember that even 70 years after Atatürk, some goals of his modernization

⁶³ Celestine Bohlen, "Few Countries Honor Their Gods the Way Turkey Reveres Mustafa Kemal Atatürk," New York Times, (May 1996).

⁶⁴ Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity," Middle East Report, (Spring 1996), p. 10, as taken from Ferhat Kentel, "L'Islam, carrefour des identités sociales et culturelles en Turquie: Le cas de Parti de la Prospérité," Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, (CEMOTI) 19 (Jan-Jun 1995), pp. 211-227.

program have not yet been achieved--most notably in the economic arena. (For more on Atatürk's reforms see Chapter VI, part B on Kemalism). That Europeans believe this is shown by a 1989 poll which showed that only 13% of Europeans in 1989 thought "Turkey is a modern country" while 67% said it was not.⁶⁵ There remains in Turkey a significant minority of citizens who do not feel that westernization has conveyed the economic advantages they expected as well. The recent example of the Welfare Party's success with the largest percentage of the vote in the 24 December 1995 elections at 21.4%⁶⁶ is seen by many analysts as a result of economic disenfranchisement as much as a vote for a more Islamic Turkey.⁶⁷ In one study by TÜSİAD (Turkish Businessman's and Industrialist's Association), "... in 1989 the richest 20% of Turkish society controlled 60% of the national income while the poorest 20 percent controlled only 4 percent."⁶⁸

Welfare victory by no means represents an Islamist mandate and also owes a significant amount to the competition for centrist votes by Turkey's more moderate parties. Using figures from the table below shows that "centrist" parties (center left, center, and center right) earned 68% of the vote with the remainder split strongly to the right.

⁶⁵ See Appendix B, Table B14a. Note this figure is probably based on ignorance rather than knowledge as indicated by the relatively low number of people responding that they "know Turks," (Table B14f). Another telling figure would be the number of Europeans who have actually visited Turkey which this author suspects is under 30 percent.

⁶⁶ Celestine Bohlen, "Islamic Party in Turkey Is Asked to Form Coalition," The New York Times International, (10 January 1996), p. A6.

⁶⁷ Examples include Ertugrul Kürkçü, "The Crisis of the Turkish State," Middle East Report, (Spring 1996); Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," Middle East Report (Winter, 1996), p. 53.

⁶⁸ Kürkçü, p. 7.

Table 1: Turkey's Political parties as of 24 December 1995⁶⁹

Party	English Name	Abbreviation	% Dec Vote	Rating	Leader
Anavatan Partisi	Motherland Party	ANAP	24%	center right	Mesut Yilmaz
Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi	Republican People's Party	CHP	11%	center left	Deniz Baykal
Demokratik Sol Partisi	Democratic Left Party	DSP	14%	center left	Bülent Ecevit
Doğru Yol Partisi	True Path Party	DYP	19%	center right	Tansu Ciller
Halkın Demokrasi Partisi	People's Democracy Party	HADEM	4%	left (pro-Kurd)	not given
Milliyyetçi Hareket Partisi	Nationalist Movement Party	MHP	8%	right	not given
Refah Partisi	Welfare Party	RP	21%**	far right, pro-Islam	Necmettin Ergakan

**round-off error of 1%

Nonetheless, there is some unease with creating Atatürk's secular western-style nation out of Islamic roots (although even the anti-secularists are alleged to regard Atatürk "as the first among the great men of all time, even before the Prophet.")⁷⁰ An early example of the Turkish unease with secularization is seen in the first free Turkish election (1950) when the winner was President Menderes who ran on a platform promising greater privatization of industry and religious tolerance.⁷¹ A *Financial Times*

⁶⁹ Data for this table is taken from Mark Rosenshield, "Turkey's Major Political Parties," *Middle East Report*, (April-June 1996), p. 4. Note that Rosenshield's article states the Welfare Party won 28.73 percent of the vote. This, however, appears to be a typographical error, otherwise the total for the "% Dec Vote" column would be 108 percent. Figures for the outcome of the election do vary from source to source. Metz, on page xxxviii, for example, says that the Motherland Party won 19.6 percent versus Rosenshield's 24%. This is apparently due to when various authors obtained the percentages for their articles.

⁷⁰ Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity," *Middle East Report*, (Spring, 1996), p. 10.

⁷¹ Metz, p. 4. Eventually the military came to believe that his reforms were in contradiction to their image of Kemalism and he was disposed by them in a coup in 1960.

Survey on Turkey states, “It is not often appreciated that this is one of the great mosque building periods in Turkish history and that one child in eight in secondary education is attending a religious school.”⁷² Eventually Menderes’ policies were perceived as such a threat to Turkish secularization (“Kemalism”), that the military, who even today see themselves as the guarantors of Atatürk’s reforms,⁷³ overthrew his government in 1960--only 10 years after democratic elections were allowed.⁷⁴ Since then there have been two other military takeovers, in 1971 and again in 1980. The 1980 coup was particularly troubling to Europeans since Turkey was already working closely with European institutions and it was thought as part of its drive towards EEC and WEU full membership to be adhering to a policy of legal power turnovers.

b. Human Rights, the Rule of Law and the Kurds

The Kurdish problem symbolizes to many Europeans the problems Turkey has with respect to human rights and the rule of law. Although human rights violations are probably overstated in much of the European press (the article which first appeared in *The European* (11-17 January 1996) with gruesome pictures of alleged Turkish special forces soldiers posing with the severed heads of alleged PKK members is probably the most extreme example), there are grounds for concern. The real problem, though, is trying to assign ultimate culpability for the violence which originated in Kurdish-populated

⁷² David Tonge, “Moving Cautiously Towards Reform,” *Financial Times Survey* from Lexis/Nexis, (14 May 1985), p. 1.

⁷³ A significant aspect of “Kemalism” is the very important role played by the military in maintaining Turkey’s secular path. Heinz Kramer, *Die Türkei als Regionalmacht, Brücke und Modell*, (Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 1995), p. 35; Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-14.

⁷⁴ Metz, p. 4. Europeans were not only upset by the military coup which overthrew Mr. Menderes, but also that he was hanged for his “crimes.” This is perhaps hypocritical considering World War II, with its atrocities which Turkey managed to avoid, started only twenty years earlier.

regions of Anatolia and have since spread to Europe as Kurdish terrorist groups carry their cause abroad.⁷⁵ It is therefore not surprising that even mildly left-of-center publications such as *Der Spiegel* are decidedly anti-PKK if not pro-Turkish.⁷⁶

Since the 1980s, the PKK has been waging a high profile terrorist campaign both within and without Turkey. The result is, in European eyes, an escalation of violence on their territory as well as within Turkey and significant human rights violations by Turkey which the European public is unwilling to countenance despite their own implications in World War II and its associated atrocities.⁷⁷ (For more on the PKK and legal issues, see chapter VII, Parts B and C).

3. CFSP

The most important aspect of concern to Europeans in the formation of a common foreign and security policy with respect to Turkey is the problem of Greek-Turkish relations which have been bad for centuries and which need to be solved prior to Turkish admission to the EU and WEU, especially since unanimity is required to admit a new member.

⁷⁵ Tomas Avenarius, "Ocalan Threatens 'Suicide Attacks' in Turkey, Germany," from Munich Süddeutsche Zeitung, translation provided by FBIS, (30 March 1996), p. 9; Stephen Kinzer, "Anti-Turkey Kurdish Separatists Blamed for Attacks Across Europe," Special to the New York Times, from Lexis/Nexis, (5 November 1993), Section A, p. 6; and Hugh Pope, "The Kurds: Why Are They Causing Havoc in Europe?" The Independent, from Lexis/Nexis, (27 June 1993), p. 12.

⁷⁶ "Myth of Omnipotence; Two Prosecution Witnesses reveal the Methods of the Proscribed Kurd Organization," from Hamburg Der Spiegel in German, translation provided by FBIS, (1 April 1996), pp. 62-69.

⁷⁷ Some Turkish officials believe that Europeans are using Turkey's alleged human rights violations with respect to the Kurds as an excuse to keep Turkey out of the EU and WEU. See "Photographs and Article Published in The European Newspaper," Turkish Foreign Ministry Press Release, Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage on the Internet at <http://www/mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/0.htm>, (12 January 1996).

Greek-Turkish animosity primarily concerns protection of their respective ethnic groups on Cyprus and territorial rights to certain Mediterranean islands and the waters and airspace surrounding them.⁷⁸ The difficulty for Europe is that Greece is willing to use her membership in any of the pan-European organizations in which she is a member (NATO, the EU, the WEU, CofE, and OSCE), and especially the EU and WEU, against Turkey whenever possible, and that Europe has proven ineffective at handling Greek-Turkish disputes without United States help.⁷⁹ Naturally, Greek-Turkish tension affects the smooth functioning of all these organizations and could theoretically call into question the viability of any or all of the above organizations were Greece and Turkey to actually go to war.⁸⁰ In the case of the EU and WEU, many Europeans fear full membership by both Turkey and Greece would amount to Europeans assuming responsibility for solving disputes between the two countries. The recent Imia/Kardak Islets dispute is a case in point; Europe attempted to intervene, but proved unable. It was only with United States intervention that conflict on a wider scale was avoided.⁸¹ (For more on this, see chapter VII, Part A.2).

Another CFSP-related concern Europeans have over extending their border southeastward parallels the Greek-Turkish issue--Europeans would rather have the United

⁷⁸ Metz, pp. 53-56.

⁷⁹ William Drozdiak, "Europe's Dallying Amid Crisis Scares Its Critics," International Herald Tribune, (8 February 1996), p. 6.

⁸⁰ NATO withstood this test when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and was highly influential in ending the conflict as well as keeping it "contained."

⁸¹ Philip H. Gordon, "America, the White Knight Should Stop Humiliating Europe," International Herald Tribune, (17-18 February 1996), p. 6; "Deputies Fault EU's Handling of Aegean Turmoil," International Herald Tribune, (16 February 1996), p. 5; and "Cyprus: Kliridhis Questions EU as Security Guarantor," Nicosia O Agon, in Greek, translation by FBIS, (5 Feb 1996), p. 5; Henze in Fuller, pp. 8-11.

States available to take the lead rather than putting themselves in a situation where Americans might expect them to intercede on Turkey's behalf were there a major problem with one of Turkey's non-Greek neighbors (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia).⁸² In the present security arrangement, this is not a major problem since the only real security guarantees Europeans have vis-à-vis with Turkey are through NATO--which implies United States involvement were there a problem such as the recent Second Gulf War.

4. Economic Competitiveness and Population Growth

a. Economic Competitiveness

Europeans perceive the Turkish economy as problematic but with potential.⁸³ It is often called centrally organized, restrictive of foreign-owned businesses, not-competitively organized, corrupt and undisciplined. Further, it suffers from high inflation, low infrastructure investment and too much government control.⁸⁴ On the upside, economic analysts have been predicting doom for Turkey for years: "Yet the country's resilience is almost miraculous, muddling through the most daunting problems."⁸⁵ Further, foreign investors see the worth in Turkey as shown by most of the world's multi-nationals having a presence there with ongoing plans by Asians and Europeans to continue investing in what they believe is an under-penetrated market.⁸⁶

⁸² Lesser, in Fuller, pp. 104, 115

⁸³ Marie-Grance Calle, "Paris Wants to Double Trade with Turkey," Paris Le Figaro-Economie Supplement, in French, translation provided by FBIS, (25 May 1996). "Turkey is a Eurasian Dragon which is at or door and within our reach."

⁸⁴ Barham, p. I; Hiç, pp. 17-24.

⁸⁵ Barham, p. I.

⁸⁶ ibid.

b. Population Growth

Turkey's population growth rate is the highest in Europe at 1.97 percent⁸⁷ and the country is expected to have 75 million people by the year 2000.⁸⁸ In 2009 Turkey's population will surpass the Germany's if present trends continue.⁸⁹ Burgeoning population is both a boon and a bane to Europe. On the negative account, it means that there will be increasing pressure on European nations by Turkey to accept Turkish migrants who are unable to find work at home.⁹⁰ Additionally, were full EU membership granted, there would be no legal restrictions on Turkish workers (or other European workers, for that matter), moving abroad to find employment.⁹¹ Based on opinion polls of EU citizens on questions of Turkish immigrants, it appears that Europeans would not be amenable to sizable numbers of new Turkish migrants.⁹² Turkey's rapidly growing

⁸⁷ *World*, p. 426.

⁸⁸ James Buchan, "Family Planning Still in its Infancy," *Financial Times Survey*, (17 May 1982), Section III, p. XV.

⁸⁹ Using figures from *World*, Turkey with a population growth rate of 1.97% and 63.4 million people in 1995 (p. 426) and Germany with a growth rate of 0.26% and 81.3 million people in 1995 (p. 159), Turkey will be more populous than Germany in 2009 with 85.1 million inhabitants to Germany's 84.5 million. Making the bold assumption that population growth demographics remain constant for an even longer term with respect to Russia (149.9 million inhabitants in 1995 with a growth rate of 0.2%, *World*, p. 353) shows Turkey's population passing Russia's in 2043 with 165.7 million versus 165.3 million inhabitants.

⁹⁰ Leslie Colitt, "Bitter Times for Workers Abroad," *Financial Times Survey*, (May 17 1982), Section III, p. X. In 1982, Turkish workers sent home US \$2.85 billion.

⁹¹ *The Maastricht Treaty*, from the Internet at <http://www.cec.lu/en/record/mt/heads.html>, (adopted 10 December 1991, ratified 1 November 1993). Title II, Article G, Section B, reads "Article 3 shall be replaced by the following:

Article 3: For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein:

(c) an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital . . ."

⁹² See Appendix B, Tables 14e and 14f. When citizens of all twelve European countries were asked in 1989 to respond to the statement "Many Turkish Workers live in our country," six out of twelve--Austria, Denmark, West Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland--responded with over 90 percent "agree/yes." The same respondents from these same countries, when asked to respond to "I've already gotten to know Turks," had an average "yes/agree" rate of only 56 percent. This suggests one of two possibilities. First that the real density of Turks living abroad in Europe is generally lower than the

population offers two advantages as well. One is that consumer demand for European manufactured goods should increase proportionate to the population so long as growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) outpaces that of the citizenry.⁹³ Second, Turkey has a large, growing pool of inexpensive labor that could be employed by manufacturers desiring to produce products for export (but that labor pool is constrained by relatively poor education standards).⁹⁴

respondents indicated or, second, that ethnic Europeans and Turks do not mix. Giving credence to the former hypothesis is the fact that Germany, which has the highest Turkish population in Europe at just over 2 million also had the second highest "yes/agree" response rate at 69 percent (Denmark was first at 71 percent).

⁹³ Barham, p. I.

⁹⁴ John Barham, "Riskier than Usual," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. III.

II. TURKEY: PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE

Turkish membership in the EU and WEU is predicated upon her desire to do so.

The fall of the Soviet Union and impact of the Second Gulf War have changed the paradigm of Turkish-European relations and many Turkish experts no longer believe that Turkish membership is as important as it was prior to 1991.⁹⁵ The implications for European and American economic and foreign policy are significant; therefore, considerations, pro and con, that Turkish leaders must weigh in their quest for EU and WEU membership need to be understood.

A. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE


Turkey finds herself at a crossroads between cultures, economies and politics and has commensurately complicated foreign policy concerns which may be larger than Europe wants to assume.⁹⁶ (see Map 1, page 32). "Turkey is connected geographically, ethnically or politically to the problems of Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Russia, Tajikistan, Syria and Islamic fundamentalism. [sic] Turkish foreign policy today is a 360-degree nightmare."⁹⁷ Perhaps because of the vast array of foreign policy issues confronting her, Turkey seeks to influence events conservatively. To this end, Turkey has membership in almost all pertinent international organizations and exerts

⁹⁵ Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 225-227; Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No.2), pp. 40-43; Lesser in Fuller, pp. 104-107; Öniş, pp. 52-57; Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey, A Modern History, (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), pp. 321-322

⁹⁶ Note that by European standard of geography and population, Turkey is a large state with almost half the area of the original EU member states as well as being the second most populous after Germany and before France.

⁹⁷ Friedman, "Pay Attention as Turkey . . ."

Map 1: Turkey and Neighboring Countries⁹⁸



⁹⁸ Political Map of the World, (Washington, DC: CIA, 1995).

“a moderate influence” in all of them.⁹⁹

The foreign policy of Atatürk provides a historical tradition for Turkey’s conservative foreign policy. He strongly believed that the hard-won victories at Lausaune were best maintained through adherence to the status quo--i.e. non-involvement in extra-Turkish issues culminating with neutrality during the Second World War¹⁰⁰ This tradition of generally not taking the lead in independent foreign policy formulation seems to be changing somewhat today, but is still motivated by Atatürk’s policy of “Peace at home and peace in the world”.¹⁰¹ Turkey maintains that her desire to become a full member of the EU and WEU is a logical continuation of her traditional foreign policy and that membership would add increased credibility to her foreign policy initiatives such as formation of the Black Sea Economic Consortium and support of the Economic Cooperation Organization as well as add to her credibility as a secular Islamic state.¹⁰²

Joining the EU as a full member increases Turkey’s international influence by guaranteeing her a larger say in decision making and policy formulation than associate status presently allows. This is related to the right to vote and decision-making within the EU. As an associate member, Turkey can offer opinions and lobby for her desires, but she is not allowed to vote on them herself. Additionally, a single “no” vote by any full member, such as Greece, is all that is required to defeat an initiative. Full membership, by

⁹⁹ David Barchard, “Staying Well Out of Russia’s Orbit,” Financial Times Survey, (14 May 1984), P. VI. See, also, Appendix A for a list of all international organizations of which Turkey is a member.

¹⁰⁰ Zürcher, pp. 209-214.

¹⁰¹ “Interview with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal,” Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/news/0216p09.htm> (printed May 1996) and; “Politics and Policy,” Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/p_rela03.htm, (as of 23 October 1996).

¹⁰² For more on the BSEC, see Chapter III, Section B, Part 1.

inference, would place Turkey in a position to respond in kind to those nations who would thwart Turkish desires as well as afford Turkey an equal footing for dialogue which might manage some volatile issues before they became serious.¹⁰³ Were Turkey to gain full EU membership, she expects to gain economically through EU grants, loans, and increased investment trade. Currently Turkey is not a full member and Greece, in particular, uses her vote freely in hindering actions that would benefit her neighbor.¹⁰⁴ CU already is seen as a validation of the goal of EU membership: "The CU will open new horizons in many fields from foreign policy to the economy and will promote Turkey's regional importance. Having gained new weight, Turkey will continue to reinforce regional peace, stability and prosperity and the image 'Turkey a world state' will be strengthened."¹⁰⁵

Full membership in the WEU increases Turkish international influence by giving her a vote in an organization which she also perceives as subject to excessive Greek influence on the same basis as occurs within the EU.¹⁰⁶ Membership in the WEU would

¹⁰³ "Turkey: Yilmaz Announces Reform Program," Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, translation provided by FBIS, (6 May 1996). It is clear that Turkey already expects improved voice on CU issues: "Turkey, which has fulfilled the responsibilities stipulated by the CU agreements, is justified in expecting the same kind of responsible behavior from the EU and adamantly demands that all the provisions of the agreement be put into effect. This will ensure that the EU does not take sides in the disagreements between Greece and Turkey and that the full membership of Greece will not affect the relations between the EU and Turkey."

¹⁰⁴ "Greece: Politicians' Reaction to Turkey's Claims on Island," Athens News in English from FBIS, (6 June 1996), p. 3; "Turkey: Officials on EU, Greek Positions on Yilmaz Offer," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (27 March 1996); "Turkey: Yilmaz 'Fails' to Change Greek, EU Positions," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS (26 March 1996); John Palmer, "Restraint Plea to Aegean Rival," London The Guardian, from FBIS, (27 Feb 1996); and "Brussels Backs Aegean Court Case," Financial Times, (22 Feb 96), p. 3. Numerous other sources are available.

¹⁰⁵ "Customs Union," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/news/0216po8.htm>, (May 1996).

¹⁰⁶ On voting, the Brussels Treaty states in Article VIII, section 4, "The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

also extend WEU Article 5 security guarantees to her international disputes with Greece, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria (see Map 1, page 32).¹⁰⁷ WEU membership would also represent a significant deepening of Turkey's relationship with NATO as a major component of the 'European Pillar of NATO' which Turkey sees as a potential threat to NATO's premier role in European defense were a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) instituted outside of NATO.¹⁰⁸

Finally, WEU and EU membership might enhance Turkey's ability to negotiate with Syria, Iraq and Iran on issues of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since it is already a major concern with Europeans and of the WEU.¹⁰⁹ This could happen several ways. First is that Turkish membership might allow Turkey to deal with her Middle

¹⁰⁷ Article 5 of the WEU Treaty, the "Brussels Treaty," states: "If any one of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." (1954). Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, in turn, states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." (San Francisco, 24 October 1945).

Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty states, in part, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them [sic] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking [sic] such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." From NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), p. 144.

¹⁰⁸ "European Security and Defense Identity and Turkey," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.mfa.tr/GRUPF/secure.htm>, (18 May 1996). A major part of Turkish concern is, again, Article 5 guarantees because only full WEU members enjoy their benefit. In short, Turkey fears that an Europe without a powerful NATO implies a Turkey without a credible defense guarantee.

¹⁰⁹ Mr. Kotsonis, Rapporteur, Parliamentary Co-Operation in the Mediterranean, WEU Unclassified document, WEU document 1485, (6 November 1995), pp. 27-39. The Appendix, "Proliferation and Arms Control in the Mediterranean" is quite forceful on this, fully backing the principle proposals of United States-proposed Middle East arms control initiative although WEU members deplore ongoing sales by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council including the United States.

Eastern neighbors from a position of greater strength.¹¹⁰ Second is that she would have greater influence within the WEU and EU to exert pressure on border nations that develop and threaten to use WMD.¹¹¹ Lastly, assuming WEU Article 5 guarantees are taken seriously by nations bordering Turkey, there should be less threat of their use against Turkey by a rational actor.¹¹²

There is a downside to EU and WEU membership which Turkey's leaders have to consider as well. Purely as a point of conjecture, it is also possible that it is in Turkey's best interests vis-à-vis her neighbors to keep the WEU and EU at arms length--to maintain close ties but not actually accept membership.¹¹³ The logic is clear, "one's allies tend to determine one's enemies."¹¹⁴ This, though, does not seem to be a major concern for Turkey as evidenced by her continued desire for closer ties to Europe.

B. SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Validate Western Path

Turkey is a nation at a crossroads between Europe and Asia, between Christianity and Islam and between the rich north and poor south. Turkey is the most significant example of a secular Islamic state and is therefore not widely accepted by her Middle

¹¹⁰ Arguing for the opposite is the example OPEC which, without a military arm, successfully defied the combined economic giants of Europe and the United States in the 1970s.

¹¹¹ WMD are generally considered to include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as intermediate and long-range missile regardless of warhead. Kotsonis, p. 29.

¹¹² Irrational actors, such as Saddam Hussein who began the Second Gulf War with the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, may not be influenced. Iraq's leader clearly was not daunted with taking on NATO forces (although they did not fight as part of NATO) as well as the national forces from other Middle Eastern countries and around the world simultaneously. His missile attacks on Israel with the knowledge of a strong American response short of counter use of WMD is a case in point. Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel After the War," *Foreign Affairs*, (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No. 2), pp. 22-23.

¹¹³ Öniş, p. 48.

¹¹⁴ Kuniholm, p. 48.

Eastern neighbors. Further, most Middle Eastern States identify themselves as Arab or Persian, not Turk. Finally, from the 16th century through World War I, major portions of the Middle Eastern nations bordering Turkey were ruled by the Ottomans whose Sultan regarded himself as the “keeper of the faith” and the leader of the Islamic world--whether the Arabs and Persians agreed or not.

Turkey, as well, has an old western legacy beginning with contact with the retreating Byzantine Empire which culminated with the fall of Constantinople in 1453. With conquest much of the western legacy of the Byzantines was swept aside, but aspects of culture informally remained in the minority Greek, Jewish and Christian communities as well as formally in the Greek Orthodox church of which Sultan Mehmet II declared himself protector.¹¹⁵ Since the 1500s, Turkey has been a major power broker in European affairs--albeit often on the enemy side and since the 17th century has been a significant economic player as well, although relatively backwards, especially in later years.¹¹⁶ The attempted modernizations of the Ottoman Empire on a western model start with the Reform Edict of 1839 and continued into the early 20th century although with numerous reverses.¹¹⁷ Reverses included the suspension of the constitution in 1878 and the

¹¹⁵ Metz, p. 19. Mehmet II, who captured Constantinople renamed it Istanbul, turned the cathedral of Hagia Sophia into a mosque and kept the city as the ecclesiastical center of the Greek Orthodox Church with himself as its protector.

¹¹⁶ Zürcher, pp. 17-21.

¹¹⁷ Zürcher, pp. 52-137. These reforms were primarily based on the British model based Britain's role as the the world's premier economic and military power. There is doubt as to the sincerity of Sultan Abdülmecit based on issuance of the edict on the occassion of severe Ottoman reverses in Egypt. These reforms included: “The establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the sultan’s subjects; An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax-farming; A system of conscription for the army; and equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion.” It was the Young Turks who, through a revolution, forced the reintroduction of the suspended Constitution (p. 97-98) with the hope of reviving the greatness of the old Ottoman Empire using western ideas (pp. 90-94).

reentrenchment of palace despotism at the same time.¹¹⁸ It was the Young Turks who, through a revolution, forced the reintroduction of the suspended constitution with the hope of reviving the greatness of the old Ottoman Empire using western ideas in 1908.¹¹⁹ Their reforms alternated between liberalism and dictatorship, were interrupted by World War I, and finally culminated with Atatürk's founding of modern Turkey in 1923.

Atatürk continued and accelerated the westernization of Turkey under a form of dictatorship called "Kemalism" after him.¹²⁰ Today, Kemalism is widely seen as a positive event and the dictatorship period which ended with the 1950 elections as necessary. The consensus among Turks is that without the strong hand of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Turkey would not have survived following World War I, nor would she have her present day unique status as a secular Islamic state.¹²¹ Today, Turkey is a democratic state although many Europeans evidently think otherwise.¹²² Proof that democracy is functioning is demonstrated by the military not interfering in Welfare's attainment of national leadership—a condition which through the 1980 coup, would almost surely have resulted in another military takeover.¹²³ A knowledge of Atatürk's far-reaching reforms is necessary to

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 80.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 90-98. The Young Turks were an organized group of western-educated (often in Paris) leaders motivated by ideals of Turkish nationalism.

¹²⁰ Kemalism never became an all embracing ideology and, very significantly, meant very different things to different people. Under Atatürk it was a dictatorship with some fascist overtones, but with some very important differences as well. Atatürk, for example, never participated in mass rallies as did his contemporaries Mussolini and Hitler. Broadly defined, Kemalism (sometimes also called Atatürkism) relied on six arrows: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism. Zürcher, pp. 189-190 and 347-348.

¹²¹ Zürcher, pps. 95-228, talks in detail about the meaning of Kemalism to the Turkish state.

¹²² See Appendix B, Tables B12 and B14c.

¹²³ It is noteworthy that the military and public are so aware of the concept of military intervention that the military has publicly indicated it would not intervene in civilian politics--so long as it does not attempt to impose fundamentalism on the country, Sami Kohen, "Islamic Party Win Worsens Turkey's East vs. West Woes," The Christian Science Monitor, (27 December 1995).

understand the tremendous human and political capital Turkey has invested in westernizing. A summary of high points includes:

- | | |
|---------|--|
| 1924 | Caliphate, Islamic schools, <i>seriat</i> (Islamic Law) courts and the ministries of Seriat and Evkaf (pious foundations) were abolished. |
| 1925 | Sects and orders were banned and monasteries closed. |
| 1924-25 | Direktorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) replaced the two above-listed ministries. ¹²⁴
Also a Ministry of Education to supplant that of the religious order was created. |
| 1926 | Swiss civil code introduced. Voting right for women introduced. |
| 1928 | Constitution changed to say that Islam no longer the state religion
Latin alphabet replaced Arabic
Outlawing of traditional and religious garb
Introduction of metric system and Gregorian calendar. ¹²⁵ |

The relevance of these reforms to modern Turkey is unquestioned and in fact they are specifically mentioned as part of the current Turkish constitution in Part V, (Miscellaneous Provisions), Article 174 which states “No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey.” These reform laws include most of the above in either fact or essence and specifically cover the educational system (1924), the wearing of hats (1925), the closing of religious institutions (1925), the adoption of international numbers and of the “Turkish Alphabet” (1928). The constitution further mentions the

¹²⁴ The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) was ostensibly created to assist Islamic organizations in meeting the needs of the new Turkish State. Its duties included “administration of the mosques, the training of new religious leaders, and the examination of the content of sermons in the mosques.” In effect it served to repress much religious activity, especially that which competed with the state for influence and power. From Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey,” *Middle East Journal*, (Volume 50, Number 1, Winter 1996), p. 42.

¹²⁵ Ayata, p. 41.

reforms laws that made marriages secular (1926), abolished certain titles such as Efendi, Bey or Pasa (1934) and prohibited the wearing of certain garments (1934).¹²⁶

Today, Turkish membership in the EU and WEU is seen by Turkey's leaders as the logical progression and vindication of secularization and westernization and therefore a deepening of Atatürk's legacy.¹²⁷ It is reasonable to expect that membership would be viewed as proof to Turkey's citizens that her political elite has not been pursuing an inappropriate foreign policy since Atatürk and especially since World War II. Turkey's membership in the EU and WEU, then, would demonstrate validity of Westernization and secularization--or so it is hoped.

2. Islamic Backlash

There is, in fact, only one major danger to Turkey if she were to gain EU and WEU membership. That is an increase in anti-western public opinion on a much larger scale than may have accompanied Turkish admission into the European Customs Union. The increasing share of Welfare Party votes in the national December 1995 election can be seen as one manifestation of this. The evidence; however, is not conclusive, but is a concern to Turkey's leadership.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, from the Internet at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/Anayasa/i142.htm> (1982).

¹²⁷ "Turkey: Yilmaz Announces Reform . . .," In this wide-ranging speech, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said "The main aim of our government--which considers Turkey's integration with the EU and the modern world as its inalienable goal--is to help the CU succeed and ensure that it is of utmost benefit to Turkey."

¹²⁸ Keep in mind that although the Welfare Party was asked to and has formed the current Turkish government, their victory was hardly a clear majority as they only received 21% of the popular vote. Other factors that may have had more influence than CU include Turkey's relatively poor economic performance in 1994 and the first part of 1995.

The Turkish constitution goes out of its way to make allowances for the practice of religion (part 4, article 24).¹²⁹ As Islam is currently practiced in Turkey, despite western rhetoric to the contrary, there is no real risk of a true popular turn to fundamentalism.¹³⁰ There is, however, a very real chance that relatively conservative elements, such as the Welfare Party, will gain increased power and prestige--at least temporarily.¹³¹ But even the Welfare Party may be too liberal and western leaning for Middle Eastern and North African Islamic countries as evidenced by the recent extreme example of Colonel Quadafi's rebuke to Primer Minister Erbakan for oppression of the Kurds and ties to the west.¹³² More moderate examples have to be inferred. European leaders, for example, regard Turkey as an example of a secular Islamic state that should be emulated by other Muslim states and at least one prominent writer on Middle East affairs

¹²⁹ Part IV (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), Article 24, reads in part "Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14 [Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]. [sic] No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets."

¹³⁰ Henze in Fuller, pp. 5-8.

¹³¹ It is almost impossible to talk about the Welfare Party without, at the same time, talking about its leader, Necmettin Erbakan. A short biography from Zürcher (p. 353) reads "(1926-). Graduated from Istanbul Technical University as an engineer (1948). Taught at the same establishment (as a professor from 1962). Came to the fore as president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, where he was a spokesman for conservative small business. Elected to the assembly as an independent in 1969. In 1970 founded the 'National Order Party', which had Islamic fundamentalist traits. The party was closed down in 1971, and re-emerged as the 'National Salvation Party' in 1973. Erbakan became vice-premier and minister of state in 1973, when his party joined the governing coalition with Ecevit's RPP. Served in the 'Nationalist Front' cabinets of Demeril (1974-7). Banned from political life in 1980, he returned to head the 'Welfare Party' after 1987."

¹³² "Turkey should not fight against people seeking their independence"; and maintaining ties too close to the west, "Foreign powers have invaded Turkey, built bases on its soil and used those bases against Iraq. We oppose US bases in Turkey and membership in NATO." This insult almost resulted in a vote of no-confidence which Prime Minister Erbakan won by only a slim margin. Yalman Onaran, "Gadhafi Raps Turkey's Policies," Washington Post Online at <http://wp2.washingtonpost.com/egi-bin/dis...al%3Astory%5Ftype%26and %26turkey%29%3AALL>, (6 October 1996).

refers to the different types of Muslim governments as an either or duality-- "Khomeinism or Kemalism."¹³³

Even today, with Prime Minister Erbakan's moderation of his anti-western rhetoric due to the strongly pro-western stance of the junior coalition partner, the True Path Party, his comments on the EU as a "Christian club" haunt him and his bias was recently alluded to as the real reason he refused to attend the EU summit dinner in Dublin.¹³⁴ (The official Turkish line on his non-attendance is that there was a parliamentary debate on the budget bill on that date, the 14th of December 1996, and instead Assistant Prime Minister Ciller represented Turkey).¹³⁵

Today, though, Turkish EU and WEU membership remains at the planning level. Nonetheless, it is at least suggestive that the fundamentally-inclined Welfare Party won the December vote only six days before CU went into effect on 1 January 1996.¹³⁶ If CU fails to live up to its billing as a vehicle to revamp and salvage the Turkish economy, it seems likely that fundamentalism of the state welfare type as exemplified by the Welfare Party will make an even stronger showing in the next polls although it appears highly unlikely, based on the previous analysis that Turkey is in danger of becoming a fundamental state.

¹³³ Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking The Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Lexis/Nexis, (Fall, 1992), sect III.

¹³⁴ "Turkey Will Not Attend Summit," BBC Radio News Service, (London, 2000 hours GMT, 4 December 1996).

¹³⁵ "Ciller to Attend Dublin Dinner," from Turkish Press Review on the Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage on the Internet at <http://mfa.gov.tr/>, (4 December 1996).

¹³⁶ A quick look at some of the poor statistics for Turkey from the table of economic indicators (see below) shows that other factors probably also played a key role in Welfare's victory.

C. ECONOMIC CONCERNS

Turkish economic issues are already dominated by the European Union with which she conducts over 50 percent of her trade.¹³⁷ The question the Turkish leadership must ask is what the effect of closer economic integration with Europe as best exemplified by CU will be. A Customs Union is "an agreement among two or more trading partners to remove all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers among themselves [and] impose identical trade restrictions against nonparticipants."¹³⁸

For a customs union to succeed it should fulfill several requirements. It should be relatively large in terms of both economic size and number of nations and the economies of the member nations should be relatively comparable in size and sophistication with one another. For Turkey, the first requirement is clearly met--the EU is the world's largest trading bloc.¹³⁹ The second requirement is not clearly met. Although Turkey has a strong economy relative to much of the world, it is relatively weak and more centrally organized than those of other EU members to include even Portugal and Greece, which are two of the poorest members. (See Table 2, page 44).

Table 2 indicates that Turkey has about half the GDP per capita of even the poorest EU members, has a population growth rate many times higher and an inflation rate that appears to be almost out of control. According to Carbaugh this places Turkey at a

¹³⁷ Öniş, p. 56.

¹³⁸ Robert J. Carbaugh, International Economics, (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 1995), p. 247.

¹³⁹ NAFTA is the second largest although some analysts believe it has the potential of becoming larger than the EU. See "The Impact of NAFTA on Direct Investment in the United States," Area Development Online, http://www.area-development.com/LO_THREE.HTM, (as of 19 December 1996).

Table 2: Selected Nations: Key Economic Indicators¹⁴⁰

Index	India	Portugal	China	Turkey
Population (1995)	63 million	10.5 million	10.6 million	81.3 million
Pop. Growth Rate (1995)	1.97%	0.36%	0.72%	0.26%
Literacy Rate (1990)	79%	85%	95%	99%
GDP (1994)	US \$305 billion	US \$107 billion	US \$93.7 billion	US \$1.34 trillion
GDP real grth rate (1994)	-5.0%	+1.4%	+0.4%	+2.9%
GDP/Capita (1994)	US \$4,910	US \$10,190	US \$8,870	US \$16,580
Inflation rate (1994)	106%	6.1%	10.9%	3.0%
Unemploy. Rate (1994)	12.6%	6.7%	10.1%	approx 10%
Exports (1993)	US \$15.3 billion	US \$15.4 billion	US \$9.0 billion	US \$437 billion
Imports (1993)	US \$27.6 billion	US \$24.3 billion	US \$19.2 billion	US \$362 billion
External Debt (1993)	US \$67 billion*	US \$20 billion	US \$26.9 billion	net less than 0
Ind. Prod. Growth (1994)	+6.7%	+3.5%	+3.2%	+2.3%

*1994

distinct disadvantage with respect to the rest of the EU since the theory of customs union proposes that she will not be able to compete.¹⁴¹ Turkey counts on the dynamic gains due to greater participation in a larger market with enhanced economies of scale, increased competitiveness, and a greater stimulus for private and foreign investment.¹⁴²

Opponents to CU have several major concerns and although one can argue they are crying “foul” after the fact, their opinions are likely to gain credence if Turkey is unable to show significant real progress as a result of closer ties to the EU through CU. The most important issue those opposed to CU have is that Turkey has become a country “that has to comply automatically with a trade mechanism that is determined by the interests of the member states.”¹⁴³ Further the 6 March 1995 CU agreement makes

¹⁴⁰ The World Fact Book, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), multiple pages.

¹⁴¹ For more information on customs union and how it relates to the European Union, see Carbaugh, pp. 247 to 254.

¹⁴² “The Customs Union Between Turkey and the European Union,” Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/cust1.htm>, (22 November 1996).

¹⁴³ Erol Manisali, Political and Economic Cost of the Customs Union, Chapters IV and V, translated from Turkish by FBIS, (8 April 1996).

absolutely no reference to future Turkish EU membership, thereby allowing Europe the advantages, from their perspective, of unlimited trade without any of the negatives such as what were part of the 1970 Additional Protocol.¹⁴⁴

Further, although Turkey's figures may look bad, it must be remembered that the EU embraced Greece, Portugal and Spain although their economies at the time of accession were significantly weaker than those of the core members. The high inflation figure actually has a relatively mild affect on Turks as wage changes and costs of goods and services are adjusted regularly and automatically to account for it.¹⁴⁵ Nonetheless, Turkey's leaders are hoping that CU will force the economy to more rapidly privatize, increase efficiency through increased outside investment in capital means of production, and coincidentally lower the inflation rate to something much closer to the European average. In sum, Turkey's leadership has weighed the economic issues and determined that full EU membership remains the logical progression of Atatürk's reforms.

Generally, it is elements of the Turkish left and right who provide the main opposition to the goal of EU (and CU) membership. To the Turkish left, EU membership appears to be more akin to a view expressed in *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*. These are "guarantees and reassurances it [EU membership] could provide to those conservatives and upper-class groups . . . that [are] most likely to feel threatened by

¹⁴⁴ The 1970 Additional Protocol was a roadmap of EU and Turkish provision that were to be met as a prior condition for Turkish entrance into the EU. The conditions which the EU rescinded and which were not reintroduced as part of the 6 March 1996 CU agreement are "(1) free circulation of labor, (2) free circulation of capital and (3) financial aid (specifically, the Fourth Financial Protocol of 1981)." From Manisali. See also Text of Decision No. 1/95 (Customs Union) of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 6 March 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union (DECISION, 1/95), from Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/cust2.htm>, (6 March 1995).

¹⁴⁵ According to Paul B. Henze, "Elaborate indexing arrangements have mitigated its effects." From "Turkey: Toward the Twenty-first Century," in Fuller, p. 16.

popular government.”¹⁴⁶ Although the elite of Turkey definitely is generally wed to the goal of further westernization, it is not just an upper-class phenomena foisted on hapless masses. “Most Turks want continued modernization, improvements in the quality of life, opportunity to better themselves as a result of education and work. Their aims are those of most Western-oriented societies. [sic] Atatürk’s principles continue to be accepted by most Turks as the basis for modern life and existence of the republic.”¹⁴⁷

Turkey wants into the EU and WEU for economic and political reasons which overall serve to bolster Turkish interests at home and abroad.¹⁴⁸ To this end, Turkey has been willing to accept concessions on membership in these and related organizations with the idea that eventually she will obtain what she wants. The problem is not usually one of all the EU nations joining forces against Turkey, as much as that any one EU member can veto or stall the effort of the other 14 since all EU decisions require unanimity. Historical instances of European interference in Turkish affairs include withholding of monies promised for development and suspension by the CofE due to the 1980 coup. As Customs Union (CU) demonstrates, even today, admission in fact does not guarantee admission in deed.¹⁴⁹

The most recent case of Turkey not enjoying promised benefits involved the Greek veto of the Turco-European Union Association Council Meeting, the reason being that

¹⁴⁶ Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, after 1990), p. 23. This book also points out that the EU accepted Spain, Portugal and Greece when at least Spain and Greece still had some very real difficulties with democratic traditions.

¹⁴⁷ Paul B. Henze, “Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century,” from Fuller, p. 3.

¹⁴⁸ “Customs Union.”

¹⁴⁹ For the viewpoint of Turkish analysts against CU see Manisali and Tarhan. For a strong Islamic viewpoint, see, “Turkey-EU Customs Union Called ‘Anexation,’ ” Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Turkish, translation by FBIS, (2 January 1996).

part of Turkey's offer of "unconditional dialogue" (on Cyprus and Aegean issues) included a number of talking points which Athens is unwilling to discuss (mainly territorial), and because it fell short of Greek demands, again with respect to territorial issues.¹⁵⁰ Ankara became worried enough to issue a statement saying that the EU must be aware that any failure to carry out obligations by the European Union was "an attitude that had legal consequences" and that "third factors" outside the CU would cause Turkey to reassess its own obligations toward the EU.¹⁵¹ On a bilateral basis there does not seem to be a problem as shown by Italy's statement in the same article that "Turks and Greeks should solve their problems in a platform independent of the customs union" since "financial cooperation is also agreed upon and has to be respected by the Fifteen." The key point is that even being "in" does not automatically confer on Turkey the advantages she desires from CU.

D. SOVEREIGNTY

The issue of sovereignty is two-sided and includes elements of foreign as well as domestic policy in the judicial and economic realms. Turkey must decide how much sovereignty she is willing to give up to pursue the benefits of full acceptance into the European club. Currently, the Turkish leadership seems unwilling to make this leap, especially with the Welfare Party at the helm.

¹⁵⁰ The territorial issues not addressed by the Council agenda specifically include EU failure to agree that "Greek territory is also the territory of Europe" as well as failure to address issues of territory strongly enough with the International Court of Justice which will eventually give a ruling on Greek-Turko Aegean and Cypriot disputes. Nazlan Ertan, "Turkey: Official on EU, Greek Positions on Yilmaz Offer," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (27 March 1996). For more detailed information on Greek-Turkish issues and how they relate to the EU, see Chapter III, Part A.

¹⁵¹ Nazlan Ertan, "Turkey: Official on EU, Greek Positions on Yilmaz Offer," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (27 March 1996).

1. Foreign policy

Increased international influence would come at a steep price which many Turks, including a powerful minority of the elite, are not willing to pay. The drawback is the correspondingly louder voice Europeans would have in Turkish affairs. Currently, when Turkey acts as her own political center as she has often done since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europeans may become upset, but are able to remain relatively indifferent overall since Turkey's actions do not obligate them either with respect to Turkey or the country with which she has been dealing.¹⁵² It might appear that this is untrue since Europe very clearly has close ties with Turkey, most notably through NATO. These ties fade in significance, however, when one realizes that in issues involving NATO, both Europeans and Americans expect the United States to take the lead (as, for example, happened in Bosnia and then again in the recent Kardak/Imia Islands dispute).¹⁵³ Hence, under the present arrangement with Turkey in the U.S. orbit as much as in the European, Turkey is able to take independent foreign policy positions without overly upsetting Europeans.

The recent examples of President Erbakan's state visits to Iran and Libya are cases in point. Had Turkey been a full member of the WEU or EU and made the same unilateral

¹⁵² Some examples of Turkish independence since the fall of the Soviet Union are founding of the BSEC, participation in the ECO, cross-border operations into Iraq against the PKK, formation of closer ties with the Turkic republics of the Confederation of Independent States and advances to other Islamic countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Singapore and Pakistan. Obviously, these fall into several categories affecting Europe: no effect (Singapore for example), negative effect (PKK) and a positive effect (CIS).

¹⁵³ Gordon, p. 6; "Deputies Fault EU's Handling of Aegean Turmoil," p. 5; and "Cyprus: Kliridhis Questions EU as Security Guarantor," pp. 8-11.

advances, Europe might have found it in her interests to voice greater objection (although still somewhat muted since Europe also has economic ties with these two countries).

The positive side of an increased European voice in Turkish affairs is as an additional voice for Turkey. For example, EU membership might translate into the much-desired construction of an oil pipeline from Central Asian or Caucasian fields through Turkey.¹⁵⁴ On the surface this issue appears economic but it is really a political one with economic underpinnings that have been strengthened by the aftermath of the Second Gulf War. As part of the Allied embargo against Iraq, Turkey shut off the pipeline from Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in 1990. This has resulted in the loss of over US \$2 billion per year to Turkey and contributes to a large degree to the economic problems she is currently having. (The total economic effect, using a multiplier of five equals an astounding US \$72 billion over the last six years).¹⁵⁵ Today, Turkey is seeking the transit of Central Asian oil through Turkey as part of a bid for diversification of her revenue basis using the logic that diversification is also in European (and American) best interests.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Stephen J. "Blank, Energy and Security in Transcaucasia," Strategic Studies Institute, (7 September 1994), pp. 19-20; and "Transporting Caspian Sea Region Oil, The Mediterranean Route: An Environmental Alternative," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://turkey.org/pipeline.htm> (as of 11 September 1996).

¹⁵⁵ Kuniholm, pp. 37-38. Turkey maintains she lost over US \$2 billion in revenue over the first three months of the crisis which rose to US \$9 billion in succeeding months. Turkey was compensated, but inadequately in her opinion. Compensation included US \$ 8 billion in arms from the U.S and Germany, US \$2.2 billion in oil, grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, France and the EC as well as possible Kuwaiti reconstruction contracts. Additionally, the U.S. raised its security assistance package to \$635.4 million of which \$500 million was a grant.

¹⁵⁶ Blank, pp. 19-20; and "Transporting Caspian Sea Region Oil." The closure of the Iraqi pipeline by the United Nations is seen as supporting the argument for diversification.

2. Domestic Policy--Legal

Turkey has a complicated domestic policy which membership in the EU and WEU would affect and which is already being affected by membership in the CU. The question Turkish leaders must answer is whether the loss of internal national flexibility engendered by EU and WEU membership would offset gains in other areas as outlined in this chapter. One of the major problems Turkey is having deals with human rights and the rule of law. The Turkish Constitution exacerbates this problem since it incorporates many legal aspects that would have better been addressed at a lower judicial level. The result is that Turkish Constitution is sometimes at odds with the mores of the EU.¹⁵⁷ That Turkey recognizes differences and the inherent inflexibility of her constitution in dealing with certain domestic issues is shown by her enactment of constitutional amendments as a condition for CU.¹⁵⁸

a. Human Rights/Rule of Law

A recent example of problems of the Turkish Constitution, lack of flexibility and the rule of law which has proven troubling for Turkey as well as for Europe was Turkey's 1994 arrest of eight members of parliament, seven of them Kurdish and one Islamist, for "supporting separatism and committing crimes against the state, punishable by death." Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, responded to European condemnation of what she regarded as an internal Turkish matter with a constitutional justification: "From the very

¹⁵⁷ For further reference, see "Constitution of the Republic of Turkey," on the Internet at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/Anayasa/i142.htm>, (as of 23 July 1996); and "The Maastricht Treaty," on the Internet at <http://www.ced.lu/en/record/mt/top.html>. This web address accesses the complete treaty as of 25 April 1996.

¹⁵⁸ Part of the democratic reform process caused by CU were sixteen amendments to the Constitution affecting such fundamental areas as voting age, trade unions, the education system, terrorism and freedom of expression. From "The Customs Union Between Turkey and the European Union," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/cust1.htm>, (as of 22 November 1996).

first day, they displayed different flags and colors. They tried to speak in a different language . . . This was against the constitution. Freedom is not a license to violate the constitution.”¹⁵⁹ Essentially the eight were accused of violating Article 3 of the Turkish constitution which reads, in part; that “The Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background . . .” Article 14 further states; that “None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms . . .” The problem for Turkey is how to preserve governmental prerogatives without being in contradiction of free speech rights as expected by EU countries. This situation might appear to have only a minimal chance at improving in the near future as the government under Prime Minister Erbakan heightens pressure on the Turkish media based on his perception of biased news coverage of a bizarre car accident involving a wanted gangster, his girlfriend, a senior policeman and a member of parliament. He and Welfare generally view the news media as anti-Islamic and have expressed their desire to curb it.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ “Ankara Hits Back at Western Detractors,” Mideast Mirror, access provided by MediaGen (UK) Ltd. through Lexis/Nexis, (Vol. 8, No. 50, 14 March 1994).

¹⁶⁰ John Barham, “Erbakan turns the screw on Turkish Media,” Financial Times, (26 November 1996), p. 4. On the car accident he says “[Three weeks ago] A car carrying a wanted gangster, his girlfriend, a senior policeman and a government MP [Member of Parliament] crashed into a truck. All died except the MP, Mr. Sedat Bucak, who belongs to the centre-right True Path party, the Islamists’ junior coalition partner.” See also Stephen Kinzer, “Scandal Links Turkish Aides to Deaths, Drugs, and Terror,” New York Times, pp. A1 and A7, (10 December 1996).

Two things work against his desired media reform. One is the detail of Turkish law and the level at which minutiae are addressed. Turkey has a difficult task when it comes to modifying her laws because so many of them are at the highest judicial level and because there are so many minor, but very detailed ones. The difficulty can be shown with a look at free-speech rights which have “154 rules concerning freedom of expression.” Minor points include such items as a prohibition against criticizing the armed forces, Atatürk or the courts.¹⁶¹

The second point making governmental tightening of free speech more difficult includes reforms made by previous governments, most notably the demonopolization of television a decade ago. Then there was only TRT (Turkish Radio Television). Today there are over 260 local and national television stations, many of which produce some of their own programs.¹⁶² In the near-term the sheer size of the mass media makes it unlikely that the government, even one somewhat opposed to critical free speech, such as the present one, will be able to effectively censor the mass media, especially on minor points.¹⁶³

Turkish law is excessively precise although in special cases it may be of benefit in curbing some government excesses. Turkish leaders realize this and they appear to be doing as much as is reasonably possibly to enact reforms quickly. A key example is Turkey’s willingness to make constitutional changes in support of CU and her apparent willingness to further modify her legal system in order to meet European standards for EU

¹⁶¹ Ibid. One has to wonder what Europeans thought of efforts in the United States to make flag desecration a constitutional crime.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

and WEU membership. As other discussion shows, changes to her legal and human rights system are not just a one-time event, but have been progressing over a very long period of time and through many different governments since 1945 and today many improvements are well-entrenched.

b. *Kurds*

The issue of the Kurds would normally be considered as a sub-category of human rights/rule of law were the Kurds not a topic of major importance in both Turkey and Europe. For a long time, Turkey's means of dealing with the Kurdish issue was to treat it as a non event and impose such seemingly benign restrictions as making Turkish the only language of Turkey¹⁶⁴.

Turkey appears to want to handle the issue of the terrorist Kurds organization, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), unilaterally. They also know that Europe responds strongly to any action taken by Turkey against the PKK and the Kurds in general. Evidence of this knowledge includes waiting until immediately after the CU treaty was signed (6 March 1996), before launching a 35,000 soldier cross-border action into Iraq (20 March 1996)--an action which Turkey knew would embarrass EU and lend credence to the warnings of European human rights observers.¹⁶⁵

For Turkey terrorism is also an international issue. Indeed there are substantiable allegations of PKK terrorist comming from Russia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria

¹⁶⁴ Henze in Fuller, pp. 21-27 and Article 3 of the Constitution, "Its (Turkey's) language is Turkish." Since 1991, use of Kurdish has been permitted in private, Bob Hepburn, "Turkey's Civil War Heating Up, Ankara Launches Crackdown Against 'Kurdish Problem', " The Toronto Star from Lexis/Nexis, (17 April 1994), p. C5.

¹⁶⁵ "Turkey Politics," International Country Risk Guide: Middle East and North Africa from Lexis/Nexis, (Information Access Company, 1 July 1995), Section No. 7.

and even Europe.¹⁶⁶ The difference between European terrorist support and the others is the level at which it occurs. At the official level, international terrorism is clearly condemned by all EU countries and there is no longer any official support for any organization employing terrorist tactics.¹⁶⁷ There is, however, a significant amount of private support, particularly from Kurdish expatriates living in Europe who are often forced to give money and support. According to *Der Spiegel* Kurdish separatist leaders in Germany routinely extort money from their countrymen to finance PKK operations within Turkey and abroad.¹⁶⁸ The other countries mentioned, though, have given at least semi-official moral and often material support to the PKK.

Like other issues of sovereignty the Kurdish problem is double-sided. With CU and especially with membership in the WEU and EU, Turkey may hope to better affect Russian policy with respect to the Kurds which is often linked to oil issues since 1991. Although senior Russian leaders do not seem to have a statement on the Kurds, lower level leaders, including some in the Duma, support the people who say things like “Unless the government resolves the problem of the 12 million Kurdish People, explosions

¹⁶⁶ Russia: Henze in Fuller, p. 24, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon: “Terrorists,” Political Risk Services, (1 January 1993); Europe: Germany: PKK Defectors Describe Party . . .

¹⁶⁷ Until approximately 1993, various European governments to include France, Germany, and Belgium did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization. Hence, the PKK was able to openly hold meetings and support rallies in these and other countries (See, for example, “Germany, Netherlands Criticised as Kurd Parliament-In-Exile Meets,” *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, (12 April 1995). It was not until Abdullah Ocalan began espousing terrorism as means to an end in both Turkey and Europe that European countries outlawed the organization (See, for example, Stephen Kinzer, “Anti-Turkey Kurdish Separatists Blamed for Attacks Across Europe,” *New York Times* from Lexis/Nexis, (5 November 1993), Section A, p. 6; and Tomas Avenarius, “Ocalan Threatens ‘Suicide Attacks’ in Turkey, Germany,” Munich *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in German, translation by FBIS, (30 March 1996), p. 9).

¹⁶⁸ “Myth of Omnipotence: Two Prosecution Witnesses Reveal the Methods of the Proscribed Kurd Organization,” from Hamburg *Der Spiegel* in German, from FBIS, (1 April 1996), pp. 62-69.

will rock the pipeline that conveys oil from Baku (Azerbaijan).¹⁶⁹ Aleksandr Nevzorov (department head of the ministerial-level Internal Intelligence Service) said in response to Turkish allegations that Duma members officially attended a PKK meeting (4-8 May 1996), that the “PKK is not a terrorist organization.” In the same article, Vladimir Pavlovich (a representative of the Russian Foreign Economic Relations Ministry) said of the PKK, “We give them certain means and we will continue to do so.”¹⁷⁰ Turkey is not a pure victim in this as there is also evidence to indicate she was supporting the Chechens in kind, but Europe apparently does not have an opinion on this.¹⁷¹

Syria presents a case where EU economic clout could also have some meaning. As of 1991, 48% of her exports and 37% of her imports came from the EU.¹⁷² In a meeting between President Demirel and Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad in 1993, Mr. Asad continued to deny Syrian support of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan,

¹⁶⁹ Semen Bagdasarov and Aleksandr Shinkin, “Ankara’s Obscure War--What Is the Aim of Turkey’s ‘Strike of Steel’ in Northern Iraq?,” from Almaty Dozhivem Do Ponedelnika in Russian, from FBIS (26 January 1996), p. 10.

¹⁷⁰ Remzi Oner Ozkan, “Russia: Turkey Questions ‘Official Support’ for PKK,” from Ankara Anatolia in Turkish, from FBIS, (1415 GMT, 22 May 1996). That Russia’s foreign policy is confused on the PKK is undoubtedly. In this article yet another Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman is quoted to say “We reaffirm our official stand, that Russia does not recognize the PKK and opposes all kinds of terrorism. There has been no change in our policy toward Turkey or in our stand against the PKK.”

¹⁷¹ It is important to note that the majority of Russian pipeline routes from the Caucasus and Central Asia, both proposed and actual, must pass through Chechnya and its capital, Grozny and goes far to explain Russian interests in their break-away republic and counter Russian claims that Turkey was giving support to Chechen rebels. For a brief summary of the Turkish Russian controversy surrounding Turkish support of Chechen rebels see the following articles: “Selin Caglayan, “A Bargain on Chechnya and the PKK,” from Istanbul Hurriyet in Turkish, translation by FBIS, (23 July 1995), p. 19; “In Response to President Yeltsin’s Statement Re: Chechen Leader Dudayev,” from a Turkish Embassy Press Release, from the Internet at <http://turkey.org/releases/09895a.htm>, (Washington, DC, 18 June 1995); Boris Yeltsin, “RTV Carries 19 October Yeltsin News Conference,” Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian, translation provided by FBIS, (1735 GMT, 19 October 1995); and “Turkish Foreign Ministry Denies Training Chechens in Turkey,” from a Turkish Embassy Press Release, from the Internet at <http://turkey.org/releases/102395a.htm>, (Washington, DC, 18 June 1995).

¹⁷² World, p. 409.

despite Turkish presentation of "pictures of Abdullah Ocalan in Damascus . . . along with his home telephone number, and his address."¹⁷³ In the same article, Demirel maintains that despite Syrian denials, there has been no real change in Syrian support for the PKK as late as July 1996. Assuming reports from Ankara are truthful (and there is no reason to doubt their veracity) it stands to reason that Turkish EU membership could be highly influential in pressuring Syria to end her support of the PKK. This is even more likely given that the PKK has now been labeled a terrorist organization by European nations as well and that membership would give Turkey greater clout in favorably pressuring other Middle Eastern nations. With the high economic and political cost of the war against the PKK as well as its seeming ineffectiveness, Turkey should seriously consider working closer with Europe rather than using her sovereignty to pursue a unilateral policy.

3. Domestic Policy--Economic

Current membership in the CU is said to violate Turkish sovereignty because certain economic decision-making authority has been transferred to the EU without an reciprocal increase in Turkish voice in the EU since none is allowed for in the 1963 Ankara Agreement which bestowed Associate status on Turkey.¹⁷⁴ According to one Turkish economic analyst, Turkey must comply with EU mechanisms without having a voice in the body which debates and makes EU economic policy.¹⁷⁵ In actuality, there

¹⁷³ Makram Muhammad Ahmad, "Interview with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel," from Cairo al-Musawwar in Arabic, translation by FBIS, (26 July 1996), pp. 18-21 and 82-83.

¹⁷⁴ Manisali. See also M. Orhan Tarhan, "Turkey Enters the Customs Union," Open Media Research Institute, from the Internet at http://pulex.med.virginia.edu/ttt@mersina/Opinion/Tarhan/Tarhan@01_01_96.htm; and Heinz Kramer, Treibt die Zollunion die EU und die Türkei auseinander?, (Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 1995).

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

already is a provision in the CU Treaty which allows for arbitration within limits. With the newness of CU it has not yet been tested, but it clearly demonstrates that there are two viewpoints on this issue and that the Turkish signers of the agreement did consider the issue of sovereignty.¹⁷⁶ Further, many of the same "rights" given up by Turkey are applied equally to the EU, such as rules on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).¹⁷⁷

Finally, Turkey remains a sovereign nation and thereby has at least three options with respect to CU that are unaffected by the CU treaty. First, if CU fails, she could consider canceling the agreement--obviously with tremendous ramifications for her bid to attain EU (and WEU) membership. Second, if CU is clearly of benefit to Turkey, then she continues to retain the right to petition for full EU membership assuming other considerations do not negatively outweigh the economic factor. Lastly, Turkey could maintain the status quo while bringing pressure on EU members to both meet all the agreements of the CU treaty as well as to modify provisions disagreeable to Turkey.

Other CU and EU issues include affects on the internal economy, particularly with respect to competitiveness. Again, though, Turkey has decided that modifying her internal economic rules and regulations in accordance with the CU treaty serves her overall interests better than keeping the old system. Reforms are far-reaching and are sure to have repercussions for the next several years at least. As a result of 'giving up' relative

¹⁷⁶ Text of Decision No. 1/95 (Customs Union). . . Articles 35 through 38 are the relevant articles. Article 38, part 1 states, in part, "If the Community or Turkey considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the terms of Articles 32, 33, or 34 and is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in Article 37 or in the absence of such rules, and if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interest of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, it may take appropriate measures after consultation with the Joint Customs Union Committee or after 45 working days following referral for such consultation. [sic]."

¹⁷⁷ Text of Decision No. 1/95, Article 38, part 2.

sovereignty, Turkey has changed, enacted or repealed laws and regulations in the areas of tariffs, internal taxes, worker and environmental safety, subsidies to domestic firms, state monopolies, intellectual property rights, and foreign and domestic competitiveness.¹⁷⁸ Further, she is voluntarily revamping her textile and agricultural policy to be compatible with the EU's.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ "The Customs Union Between . . .", and Hiç, pp. 17-23.

¹⁷⁹ "The Customs Union Between . . ."

III. EUROPE—PERSPECTIVE ON TURKEY

Views from Europe on Turkish membership are mixed. There seems little doubt that Europe wants to maintain close ties with Turkey, but there is not a consensus from either a security or economic point of view that bringing Turkey into the EU or WEU is “the natural economic counterpart of its political relationship with the West.”¹⁸⁰ As is the case for Turkish motivations for seeking admission, the issues for Europe also often have two sides of which many are economic in nature although it might seem, on the surface, that they should be security-related instead. The Turkish Straits, which historically have been a military concern to Europeans, is a case in point. Today, despite the WEU’s military aspect, the primary importance of this critical waterway is economic and Europe seeks influence through political and economic means rather than militarily.

A. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)

1. NATO/WEU

Europe must consider how NATO and the United States will react to Turkish WEU membership. On the surface it is unlikely there would be a problem since Turkey is already covered under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty which extends its NATO defense guarantees.¹⁸¹ Additionally, Turkish WEU full membership would probably be perceived by the United States as a deepening of cohesion among NATO partners at the European level.¹⁸² This could, however, add strength to the American Congress’ argument that

¹⁸⁰ Tonge.

¹⁸¹ For a comparison of NATO and the WEU’s Article 5, see footnote APPX 100 of the

¹⁸² Semih D. Idiz, “Global Approach in Ties with U.S. Sought,” Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (11 April 1995), pp. 1, A8. This article says Assistant Secretary of State, Richard C. “Holbrooke, for one, is a strong proponent of these links but believes they should develop without excluding Southeastern Europe and particularly Turkey, which he believes is a key country in any European security architecture.”; also Jopp, p. 34.

Europe is capable of defending itself without United States direct participation. Under the Frank Amendment, this could lead to even deeper cuts in American force structure in Europe as well as eventual discontinuation of America's nuclear umbrella over Europe.¹⁸³

Europe must decide, from its point of view, whether Turkey is a frontier or buffer nation. The question may seem trite on the surface, but the eventual desirability of bringing Turkey into the WEU (and EU) depends upon the classification. If Turkey is a frontier state, it is by implication a member of the European community, albeit one on the periphery.¹⁸⁴ A buffer state, on the other hand, is a convenience. It may have many of the appearances of being a member state, but ultimately it is an asset based on its geopolitical position, not on an emotional tie.¹⁸⁵

The European fear is that a formalization of defense ties to Turkey would make Turkey's problems, Europe's problems, and Turkey has more than a few that are causing difficulties with the relatively informal purely-European ties that presently exist.¹⁸⁶ Primary among European concerns is extension of the Kurdish problem which is also a

¹⁸³ The Frank Amendment did not pass but was a major attention-getter for security experts in both the United States and Europe since it would have effectively forced the withdrawal of many U.S. troops from Europe for financial support "burden sharing" reasons. See H.R. 1621, "Increased European Contributions for Maintenance of U.S. Military Personnel and Installations, Provision," (20 September 1993). Regardless, it appears that U.S. troop strength in Europe is headed to "100,000 or 75,000 or less." From Jopp, p. 35.

¹⁸⁴ British deputy Lord Finsberg appears to believe that Turkey is a frontier state. In late 1996, he recommended that the WEU's associate members should be allowed to sign the Brussels Treaty. Prior to Greek admission into the WEU, he had recommended that Turkey and Greece enter the WEU at the same time. From "Report: Turkey Should Sign Article 5 of WEU Accord," Turkish Daily News, <http://home.imc.net/turkey/news/e1201.htm>, (1 December 1995).

¹⁸⁵ Kramer's article appears to take the view that Turkey is more of a buffer state rather than a true member of Europe stating "Jeder deutsche oder westliche Versuch, die Türkei zu sehr in eine aktiv ordnungsgestaltende Rolle zu drängen oder deren Wünschbarkeit zu prononciert hervorzuheben, kann zur Destabilisierung der Türkei und zur weiteren Aushöhlung des deutsch-türkischen Verhältnisses beitragen," p. 60.

¹⁸⁶ Jed C. Snyder, "Turkey's Role in the Greater Middle East," Joint Force Quarterly, (Autumn 1995, No. 9) talks succinctly about Europe's issues with Turkey.

human rights problem.¹⁸⁷ The PKK, for example, has carried out acts of terrorism within Germany and France and has threatened German leaders for not taking a firmer stance against Turkish oppression of the Kurds.¹⁸⁸ Many Europeans believe that a security union with Turkey will force them to assist Turkey in controlling the Kurds, especially if Kurds from outside of Turkey carry out operations within Turkey.¹⁸⁹

The Kurdish issue is feared for another reason, namely as a demonstration of the risk of European entanglement in Middle East affairs.¹⁹⁰ Turkish full membership in the WEU (and EU) effectively extends Europe's borders to the Middle East and Caucasus (see Map 1). This was a significant NATO concern when the decision to accept Turkey as a member was made in 1952.¹⁹¹ Were Turkey granted membership, Europe's borders would become Turkey's, and the EU and WEU are anxious that the garrulous nations around Turkey would attempt to involve Europeans in their local concerns. This has particular ramifications for trade, especially oil, but also with respect to the large quantity of exports that Europe has to the Middle East. Europe must also consider what non-membership in the EU and WEU means to Turkey. In the words of Lord Finsberg of Great Britain, "If Turkey comes to the opinion that its full membership in the WEU and

¹⁸⁷ Mauther; John Marks, "Derailing Troubled Turkey," U.S. News and World Report from Lexis/Nexis, (November 1992, Vol. 113, No. 18), p. 73; Turkey Politics; "Government Faces Growing Criticism of Kurdish Policy," Middle East Business Weekly, (10 April 1992, Vol. 36, No. 14) p. 25.

¹⁸⁸"PKK droht mit Gewalt und Anschlägen--Verschärfte Sicherheitsmaßnahmen", Deutschland Nachrichten, (New York: German Information Center, 5 April 1996), p. 1.

¹⁸⁹ This has already happened within NATO. With respect to Germany's 1993 crackdown on the Kurds, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said, "Germany had obligations to Turkey, a fellow NATO member . . ." "Turkey," Mideast Mirror from Lexis/Nexis (Vol. 7, No. 230, 26 November 1996).

¹⁹⁰"Herzog: 'Die Europäer Leben in geborgerter Sicherheit'", Deutschland Nachrichten, (New York: German Information Center, 8 March 1996), p. 2; Etty, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Relations Between the European Union and the Middle East, Lexis/Nexis, (Commission of the European Communities, 13 November 1995).

¹⁹¹ Váli, p. 152.

the European Union is not to be realized, it may question its policies so far, including its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”¹⁹²

Israel could become a greater concern as well. Turkey is one of the few Islamic nations on genuinely good terms with Israel. Traditionally, Europe’s nations have been seeking a neutral approach toward Israel so as to not arouse Arab hostility through an over appearance of friendliness beyond the factual necessities of trade.¹⁹³ Even the recent French and EU initiative to promote peace between Israel and Syria fall into this category by demonstrating European “neutrality.”¹⁹⁴ Additionally, Turkey has allowed Israel to train its air force pilots in Turkish territory.¹⁹⁵ As an independent state, Turkey can do this without engendering a significant amount of hostility towards its international intentions. If, however, the EU were to extend its military umbrella to the borders of Iraq, Syria and Iran, these nations could possibly perceive Israeli-Turkish cooperation as being at least tacitly supported by the economically powerful EU as well.¹⁹⁶

The problem of borders is not just isolated to the Middle East. Greek-Turkish relations, which have long been a NATO problem (and hence an American issue) could

¹⁹² “Report: Turkey Should Sign Article 5 of WEU Accord,” Turkish Daily News, <http://home.imc/turkey/news/e120195.htm>, (1 December 1995).

¹⁹³ For a good discussion of EU initiatives and goals with respect to Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East, see Etty.

¹⁹⁴ “Europäische Union sucht mit USA Lösung im Nahost-Konflikt”, Deutschland Nachrichten, (New York: German Information Center, 26 April 1996), p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ Zafar Bangash, “Turkish-Israel Alliance Worries Neighbors,” Muslimedia International, <http://www.mynet.net/~msanews/MSANEWS/199606/19960614.3.html> (as of 20 December 1996). According to this article, there is apparently some controversy over whether or not Turkey is actually allowing Israeli pilots to train in Turkey. There is no controversy that Israel and Turkey signed an cooperation accord in February 1996 as well as a contract for Israel to update 54 Turkish fighter bombers at a cost of US \$500 million.

¹⁹⁶ According to Etty, the EU is taking pains to ensure there is no Middle East-European estrangement.

land firmly in the EU and WEU's lap were they to grant Turkish membership. In the recent Imia/Kardak Islets stand-off between Greece and Turkey, Europe was not able to take decisive action to end the dispute and instead relied on the United States to pull the two parties back from the brink of war.¹⁹⁷ This is extremely significant because it shows the potential weakness of the WEU and EU. Europeans possibly do not mind having a paper-tiger foreign security policy, but they certainly do not want to be directly confronted with its reality.¹⁹⁸ A flare-up of real hostility between a Turkey and a Greece within the EU and WEU would show the weakness of Maastricht's Second Pillar. The EU-WEU alternative option, to take action, could be equally as odious—Europeans could find themselves in the position of having to take a stronger position than the European Union political system is capable of.

2. Greece

Greece and Turkey share a long animosity dating from the Ottoman period and one which was highly instrumental in the founding of modern Turkey. When the Ottoman Sultan was forced to accept the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) which would have dismembered what was left of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek army was given responsibility for ensuring Ottoman compliance in Eastern Thrace. Instead Greek forces were turned back from Constantinople and eventually were evicted from modern-day European Turkey by forces led by Mustafa Kemal.¹⁹⁹ Nonetheless, the

¹⁹⁷ Barber, p. 2.

¹⁹⁸ "Deputies Fault EU's Handling of Aegean Turmoil," International Herald Tribune, (16 February 1996), p. 5. "In a resolution, the Parliament, the EU's elected assembly, deplored 'the failure of the European Union and its member states in this crisis to take effective action within the framework of the common foreign and security policy.'"

¹⁹⁹ Vali, pp. 30-31.

Kemalists were compelled at Lausanne to concede all but the Aegean islands of Imbros and Tenedos (Imroz and Bozcaada in Turkish) which lie at the entrance to the Dardenelles to Greece, thereby setting up the modern period of conflict with Greece.²⁰⁰

a. Aegean Issues

Territorial issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean stem from agreements reached at Lausanne (1923) between the Turkish government led by the Mustafa Kemal and the victorious allies of World War I. In the Aegean region, this included giving all but two of the more than 2,000 islands to Greece with their associated territorial waters (a three-mile limit at the time, later raised to six for all maritime powers). In 1994, based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Greece extended her territorial claim to 12 miles, which , if acknowledged, would give her political control of 71 percent of the Aegean from the original 43%.²⁰¹ Turkey refuses to recognize this claim for several reasons. First, acceptance would deny Turkey access to the Mediterranean without passage through Greek “territory.”²⁰² Second, Greek claims to the continental shelf of each island often conflicts with Turkish claims off mainland Anatolia. This is, in fact, the heart of the Kardak/Imia islands dispute--these two rocky outcroppings of the Aegean are located only 3.8 miles off of the Turkish coast.²⁰³ Finally, oil has been discovered off some of the Aegean islands although the quantity is unknown.²⁰⁴ Since

²⁰⁰ Vali, p. 31.

²⁰¹ Metz, p. 298. Before Greece changed her claim, they controlled 43% of the Aegean.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ “The Kardak Crisis,” Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/kardak.htm> (as of 10 December 1996). Note that the European Union backs Greece on the Imia/Kardak debate voting 342 to 21 with 11 abstentions on a resolution stating that Parliament was worried by “Turkey’s dangerous violation of Greek sovereignty.” From “Deputies Fault EU’s Handling . . .,” p. 5.

²⁰⁴ Metz, p. 55.

both countries are energy importers, this is a major point of contention, and one which has brought them to the brink of war in 1986, 1987, and again in 1995. The dispute over Aegean rocks buffets European organizations as demonstrated by problems Europe has honoring agreements made between the EU and Turkey as part of CU.²⁰⁵

b. Cyprus

In July 1974, Turkish forces invaded the island of Cyprus to guarantee the rights of the Turkish minority population of 18% who feared that Cyprus' Greek population (78%--there are 4% "other") was seeking political union with Greece.²⁰⁶ Ethnic tensions in Cyprus were generally kept under control while the island was administered as a British Crown Colony until 1960. With independence came a rise in Greek nationalism in particular and the desire by a large percentage of the Greek population to seek political union with Greece. In 1964 and again in 1967, Greek nationalism led to major crisis between the Greek and Turkish NATO allies. Hostilities came to a head in 1974 when the Greek government caused the overthrow of then-Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios III through support of a pro-Greek union group in direct violation of the accord which guaranteed Cypriot autonomy and which had been signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain in 1960.²⁰⁷ Ultimately, Turkey used Greek violation of the

²⁰⁵ Caroline Southhey, Karin Hope and Bruce Clark, "Brussel backs Aegean Court Case," Financial Times, (22 February 1996, p.3; "Greece Fights EU-Turkey Ties," Financial Times, (25 November 1996); "Deputies Fault EU's Handling . . .," p. 5; and Philip H. Gordon, "America, the White Knight, Should Stop Humiliating Europe, International Herald Tribune, (17-18 February 1996), p. 6.

²⁰⁶ As of July 1995, the total population of Cyprus was estimated to be 737,000 of which 603,000 were Greek, and 134,000 were Turks. All population figures are from The World Fact Book 1995, p. 110.

²⁰⁷ Metz, p. 52.

accord as justification for the 20 July 1974 invasion of Cyprus when they began landing forces that would reach a peak strength of 40,000 troops.

In the ensuing peace talks, a UN buffer zone was agreed to by Greece and Turkey as well as the leaders of the Greek and Turkish zones, Glavkov Kliridhis in the Greek south and Rauf Denktas in the Turkish north. The current EU role in the dispute over Cyprus centers on how the island should be governed, when and how it should be allowed into the European Union, and whether or not Turkish admission into the EU and WEU should be based on resolution of the Cyprus problem.²⁰⁸

The Greeks favor returning the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to the legitimate government of Cyprus which happens to be Greek.²⁰⁹ Turkey "remains committed to backing a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal settlement," which would formalize the partition of the island into two mostly separate countries.²¹⁰ Over twenty years later, this remains the situation with the qualification that while Greek Cyprus is officially recognized by the world community, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognized by Turkey.

Currently Greece has the upper hand in the EU on the Cyprus issue and has successfully introduced a resolution making settlement of the Cyprus issue an essential condition for Turkish admission into the EU.²¹¹ The implication is that Greece will veto

²⁰⁸ Hiç, 24.

²⁰⁹ Turkey is the only country recognizing the independent existence of the TRNC.

²¹⁰ "Foreign Ministry: 'Turkey's Position on Cyprus Unchanged,'" Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, <http://www.turkey.org/news/0216po13.htm> (as of 26 May 1996).

²¹¹ Greek Cyprus has per capita GDP of US \$12,500, inflation rate of 4.8% and GDP growth rate of 5%, making her fully qualified economically. TRNC figures are per capita GDP US \$3,500, inflation rate of 63.4% and GDP growth rate of -4% (all figures are for 1994). From The World Fact Book 1995, p. 111.

eastern EU enlargement if her desires on Cyprus not met.²¹² The Greek position was further enhanced in 1990 when the EU formally agreed to consider Greek Cyprus' admission to the EU. This act has effectively locked in the status quo with respect to any EU member vetoing the Greek resolution. This has not changed Turkey's opinion regarding Cypriot EU membership. In Turkey's official view, the Cyprus question should be resolved before either northern or southern Cyprus can be considered for EU membership, and that the Cyprus political situation should have nothing to do with Turkish admission into what is essentially an economic entity.²¹³ Cypriot attitudes differ greatly and a reading of the debate between Glavkov Kliridhis, President of the Greek Republic of Cyprus, and Rauf Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus shows both sides as intransigent.²¹⁴

Turkey's belief that the EU is primarily an economic polity and that therefore her admission should not be predicated on solving the Cyprus situation sounds logical, but misses a point about the EU that is becoming ever more clear--being a major economic power gives the EU foreign policy clout as well. That fact that the EU is factually, if not constitutionally, a political organization is shown not only by the existence of a European Union commissioner responsible for EU common and foreign security policy, but also in view of his role in the Cyprus dispute. The Commissioner, Hans Van

²¹² Bruce Clark, "Weapons Build-up Adds Urgency to Cyprus Issue," Financial Times, (4 March 1996), p. 2.

²¹³ "Turkey's Position on Cyprus Unchanged," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/news/0216po13.htm>, (as of May 1996).

²¹⁴ For an example of the intensity of the Cyprus debate among Cypriot leaders, see the "conciliatory" letter written by TRNC President Rauf Denktas to his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Glafkos Clerides in: "Cyprus: 'Full Text Denktas Letter to Kliridhis,'" (spelling change in original FBIS document), Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, (27 September 1996).

Den Broek, has actively sought to end the Turkish-Greek standoff over Cyprus, and has been willing to use relatively strong words to try and influence events by saying that while a solution to the Cyprus problem would be preferable before Cypriot accession to the EU, it was not an essential precondition.²¹⁵ His grounds for negotiating a solution appear logical, but they are also substantially vague so that the Greeks have felt it prudent to reiterate their view on Cyprus, Turkey and the EU. Van Den Broek: “I don’t think that for Turkey a situation of maintaining 35,000 troops on Cyprus, having to heavily subsidize the economy there and being confronted with constant questions about the unsolved dispute . . . is an attractive situation.” Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos “warned against any attempt to use Cyprus’ future status as an EU member to blackmail Greece into ‘submission to aggressive aspirations and schemes’ by Turkey.”²¹⁶

This sentiment is one also shared by Turkey. In the words of Prime Minister Yilmaz, “It is time to stop putting pressure on Turkey through the EU.”²¹⁷ Essentially, the EU is caught in a bind. On the one hand, its citizens expect it to do something about the Turkish-Greek dispute while on the other hand it does not seem to have the ability to do so. Since Greece is an EU member, she is not subject to the same degree of sanctions and coercion as Turkey.²¹⁸ Further compounding the EU’s ability to manage crisis are conflicting policies. On one hand there is the example of EU President

²¹⁵ “EU Official Hopeful of Cyprus Solution,” Reuters from Lexis/Nexis (2 May 1996).

²¹⁶ “EU Official Hopeful . . .”

²¹⁷ “Greece: Politicians React to Turkey’s Claims on Island,” from Athens Athens News in English, from FBIS (6 Juen 1996), p. 3.

²¹⁸ Technically, the EU is in violation of the Customs Union agreement because Greece has blocked Ecu375m (\$480m) in EU credits over the Imia (Kardak) islets, a situation which Ireland (who currently holds the EU presidency) is pressing to resolve. From “Turkey Heads EU Agenda,” Financial Times, (25 November 1996), p. 36.

Jacques Santer insisting that Greece's borders were fixed and that they were the external borders of the EU.²¹⁹ Simultaneously there is Greek frustration that the EU would not state as a precondition of the Turco-European Union Association Council meeting that "Greek territory is also the territory of Europe."²²⁰

The ultimate issue for Europeans is not whether they want to be involved in the Turkish-Greek dispute, but to what degree. Turkey outside of the EU and WEU allows the Europeans to put greater pressure on Turkey but leaves their two key organizations closely tied to Greek desires. Because of Turkey's NATO membership, barring Turkey from the WEU, in particular, has only symbolic value, but one which is irritating to the WEU and the construction of an ESDI. Tansu Ciller, the current Turkish foreign minister, has said she will veto the use of NATO equipment by the WEU as long as Greece keeps blocking Turkey's efforts to become a full member of the WEU.²²¹

Europeans seem to fear a loss of organizational effectiveness were the Turkish-Greek problem fully internalized, but there is some hope for the future if an anticipated 1997 United States initiative to re-unite Cyprus succeeds.²²² Speculation suggests that resolution will involve a "carrot" to both Turkey and Greece--perhaps progress of negotiations for EU membership for Turkey, and economic, military and ethnic population guarantees for both countries.

²¹⁹ "Greece: Politicians React to . . . , p. 3.

²²⁰ Nazlan Ertan, p. not available.

²²¹ Bruce Clark and Kerin Hope, "Greece Fights EU-Turkey Ties," Financial Times, (25 November 1996), p. 3.

²²² According to an article in the *Financial Times*, the United States is planning an "initiative early next year to re-unite the island [Cyprus]." From Clark, p. 3. Of course, other initiatives have also been started by the U.S. such as in 1985 when talks started on Cyprus' reunification--and broke down. From David Barchard, "Little Dialogue on Cyprus Dispute," Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, (20 May 1985), section III, p. V.

3. Other Countries

a. *Russia*

Russia's influence on Turkish accession to the EU and WEU is surprisingly minimal, possibly because she does not see Turkish membership as portending a major change in Turkey's current relations with the West, or possibly because she thinks it is too unlikely to worry about.²²³ This is somewhat surprising given that Russia and Turkey appear to be in competition for economic and political influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea as well as over transit rights for energy products in the Turkish Straits and attention from Europe.²²⁴ It seems, for example, that Russia's periodic attempts to increase her power within the CIS should sound loudly in European circles, given Turkey's closeness to Europe and her attempt--based on linguistic, cultural and historical ties--to increase her influence in the Turkish CIS republics.²²⁵ Russia, however, appears to not be protesting.²²⁶

²²³ I could find no example of Russia taking a stance, either pro or con, on Turkey joining the EU or WEU.

²²⁴ A mix of articles is needed to identify these areas. Central Asia and Europe--Roland Dannreuther, "Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf," *Survival*, (Winter 1993-94), pp. 92-112; Black Sea and Turkish Straits--S. Dolzhikov, "Admiral Baltin on Problems of Black Sea Fleet," from *Morskoy Sbornik* in Russian, from FBIS, (19 June 1995), pp. 6-9; and the Caucasus and energy--Ariel Cohen, "The New 'Great Game': Oil politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia," *The Heritage Foundation* on the Internet at <http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/bg1065.html> (25 January 1996). Other useful articles and books on a variety of these topics include: Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security," *European Security*, (Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 1994), pp. 734-774; John W. R. Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad,'" *Survival*, (Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 1994), pp. 70-92; Iver Neumann, "Russian Identity in the European Mirror," *European Security*, (Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1994), pp. 281-300; and William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus*, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 1995).

²²⁵ Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* from Lexis/Nexis, (Fall, 1992), section 3. Of the CIS nations, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are Muslim. Five of these are Turkish and one, Tajikistan, is Persian.

²²⁶ For a list of bilateral agreements between the two as well as a brief description of Turkish-Russian foreign policy actions, see "Turkish - Russian Relations," *Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage* at <http://turkey.org/turkey/Russian.htm>, (as of 22 July 1996).

A quiet Russia is not a non-existent Russia, however. She still has her UN security council seat, a large nuclear arsenal, a large army and a strong desire to halt her downward spiral in the international order.²²⁷ Should she desire to send a strong signal on Turkish EU and WEU accession, she certainly has the ability to do so as evidenced by her posturing against NATO enlargement towards the Baltics. Fortunately for Europe, Turkey is already a member of NATO and Turkish CU did not prompt Russian disapproval. EU and WEU diplomats can therefore make a strong case for Turkish membership in their organizations, should they choose to do so, since membership would not represent a significant change in current European-Russian or Turkish-Russian relations.

b. United States²²⁸

The United States considers Turkey a key strategic ally, especially given the official American disposition towards Iran, Iraq and to a lesser degree, Syria.²²⁹ From an American perspective, Turkish EU and WEU membership is to be encouraged for three reasons.²³⁰ First is the perceived stabilizing influence membership would have on Turkey and on her neighbors.²³¹ Turkey is viewed as an example of a moderate, secular Islamic

²²⁷ For a consideration of Russian foreign policy options, see Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality," *International Affairs*, (Vol 71, No. 1, 1995), pp. 35-68.

²²⁸ For the relevance in addressing the United States as a European concern, see Richard C. Holbrooke, "America, a European Power, Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1995), pp. 38-51.

²²⁹ Lionel Barber and Bruce Clark, "US Polices Aegean 'While EU Sleeps'," *Financial Times*, (9 February 1996), p. 2. Quoting President Clinton these authors state, "'More than any other Nato ally, Turkey needs to improve its defensive capabilities' in order to 'deter and if necessary combat . . . a very real missile threat' from Syria, Iran and Iraq."

²³⁰ "The US put enormous diplomatic effort into ensuring the approval by the European Parliament of a Turkey-EU customs accord." From Barber, p. 2.

²³¹ Lauren E. Bessent, Letter from Staff Assistant to Jesse Helms on United States relations with Turkey, (Washington, DC: 26 February 1996)

state that should be supported as an example to other Muslim nations, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia.²³² Second, from a security point of view, Turkey does not have the same geographical immediacy that she does for Europe. Hence the American relationship can perhaps be partially understood in terms of the attitude, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"--Turkey borders several nations, Syria, Iraq and Iran, with which the United States does not enjoy good relations.²³³ For the United States, the political cost of mildly supporting what Turks profess to want—EU and WEU membership--is low, and Europeans have little choice but to pay attention so long as Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs Richard Holbrooke's statement that "unless the United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done" remains true.²³⁴

This is also related to a third American consideration. Representative Barney Frank (Democrat, Massachusetts) first introduced his much-publicized 'Frank Amendment' calling for a de facto reduction in American overseas military strength on April 1, 1993.²³⁵ Part of the Frank Amendment purpose was to motivate Europeans to assume more responsibility for their own defense. Since Turkey is geographically important to the West, it is in American interests to promote Turkish admission into all

²³² Bessent.

²³³ Lowell A. Bezanis, "Greece Plans Diplomatic Push Against Turkey," Open Media Research Institute, (as of 18 November 1996). Recent of Prime Minister Erbakan's foreign policy initiatives (independent of even his own foreign ministry it should be stressed) to Iran, Libya, Sudan and Nigeria have "annoyed Washington."

²³⁴ Gordon, p. 6.

²³⁵ See H.R. 1621; and Jopp, p. 35.

European structures in the belief that this would enable Europeans and Turks to better take care of themselves.

B. ECONOMIC

1. Strategic Location

Turkey is of vital economic importance to Europe due to her key location astride land and sea routes to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Because Europe has a large economic interest in these regions, she is implicitly involved in the foreign policy arena as well.²³⁶ Currently this involvement is largely happening without a centrally organized EU strategy as leading European nations carve out their own markets in these regions.²³⁷

Potential trade is a two-way operation, especially with respect to energy issues since Europe is energy hungry and Central Asia and the Caucasus have two of the largest known oil and gas reserves in the world.²³⁸ For Europe the most important issue with this energy wealth is how to best transport conventional energy to its markets. Essentially two

²³⁶ Etty, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Relations Between the European Union and the Middle East, Lexis/Nexis, (Commission of the European Communities, 13 November 1995). This article shows EU involvement in the clearly foreign policy arena of Israeli-Palestinian peace as well as in promoting regional Middle Eastern security.

²³⁷ The Maastricht Treaty provides for collective action stating it as one of the treaty's goals in Title II, Article G, part B, article 3b states, for example, that the European Community activities "shall include . . . a common commercial policy." Europe is trying to formulate a cohesive economic policy in this spirit. See, for example, Etty, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Relations Between the European Union and the Middle East, Lexis/Nexis, (Commission of the European Communities, 13 November 1995).

²³⁸ The CIS as a whole, in 1995, had (in billions of barrels) estimated proven oil reserves of 57 barrels (compared to Saudi Arabia (1) 259; Iraq (2) 100; Iran (5) 89; United States 23; Libya 23; and Algeria 9. Estimated gas reserves (in trillions of cubic feet) were CIS (1) 1977; Iraq (10) 109; Iran (2) 742; United States (6) 162; Libya (19) 46; and Algeria (8) 128. From Basic Petroleum Data Book, (Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute, Volume XV, No. 2, July 1995), Section II, Table 4e and Section XIII, Table 7e respectively.

primary routes with a variations on the theme are possible--through the Turkish Straits or overland via a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea.²³⁹

a. Energy Transfer Hub

Europe uses energy per capita on a scale commensurate with her economic status in the world.²⁴⁰ Maintaining economic prosperity into the next century will require the tapping of large new oil and gas resources as the more traditional fields in the Middle East and North Africa become less efficient.²⁴¹ The primary alternative of nuclear energy has risen tremendously in political cost, while other possible energy sources such as solar, geo-thermal, hydroelectric-electric, wind and tidal are already either fully utilized or economically and technologically prohibitive at the present time.²⁴² Accordingly, Europe's energy solution in the 21st century could lie at Turkey's borders, in the Caucasus, Central Asia, as well in Iraq and Iran. The problem is how to get the oil and gas to Europe.²⁴³

There are several possible routes as shown in Map 2 (page 78). For Caucasian oil, the economically most sensible routes are through Azerbaijan/Iran/Turkey (Ankara or Ceyhan), via Azerbaijan/Georgia or through Azerbaijan/Russia. All three have limitations from a European perspective. The first one presents diplomatic problems because of current American sanctions against Iran as a terrorist nation which are to carry

²³⁹ Robert V. Barylski, "Russia, The West, and the Caspian Energy Hub," Middle East Journal, (Volume 49, No. 2, Spring 1995), pp. 217-232.

²⁴⁰ On Europe's need for energy, see "The Contribution of Fusion to Sustainable Development," United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority on the Internet at <http://www.fusion.org.uk/info/susdev2.htm#Contents> (as of 13 December 1996).

²⁴¹ Some analysts argue that alternative energy availability will grow faster than the need for new oil, gas and coal fields. See Tom Gray, "Worldwatch Study: Power Surge," <http://library.wustl.edu/~listmgr/devel-1/Mar1995/0024.html>, (as of 13 December 1996).


²⁴² "The Contribution of Fusion to . . ."

²⁴³ See articles by Barylski, Blank, and Lee.

over to any other nation doing business with Iran. However, for Turkey and Europe this seems to be only a minor hindrance since neither follows the United States lead in sanctions of Iran. A problem in common with the second and third routes is that transported oil must be transloaded to oil tankers for shipment through the Turkish Straits. For environmental, health and possibly economic reasons, Turkey opposes this, which lowers the value of any oil shipped to all but the Black Sea nations.²⁴⁴ A last problem deals with the Russian routes. Presently, all Caucasian oil and gas must pass through Chechnya and Grozny if Russia is to benefit from its production and shipment. Chechnya being a break-away republic, it seems highly unlikely that her leadership will allow energy shipment to continue as usual for Russia. For Central Asian oil, the best route is Kazakhstan/Russia; poorer alternatives are: Kazakhstan/Russia/Georgia, Kazakhstan/Turkmenistan/Iran/Turkey and Kazakhstan/Russia/Azerbaijan/Iran/Turkey. Without going into a detailed study of the eventual capacity of the various routes, the same general problems prevail. First, the best routes involving Russia pass through Grozny and all routes that end at other than a Turkish port must pass through the Turkish Straits. There is, of course, the possibility of a pipeline around the Straits, either through Bulgaria and Greece or within European or Anatolian Turkey, but this will add significantly to the cost due to additional transloading, and pipeline construction and maintenance costs. A pipeline going through Turkmenistan, Iran and then Turkey again suffers from United States trade sanctions as before, in addition to being a circuitous route. The advantage is that such a route would service most of the Caspian region

²⁴⁴ See page 82 on the Turkish Straits.

Map 2: Energy Transport Routes²⁴⁵



²⁴⁵ Barylski, p. 227.

including heretofore undiscovered deposits of up to 200 billion barrels of oil, which has made this region second only to the Persian Gulf in potential.²⁴⁶

The basic problem for Europe then, is that all possible routes for export of Caucasian and Central Asian oil have suffered from serious political or economic drawbacks. Since there is nothing Europe can do about existing national boundaries currently in effect, she has to determine the best way of dealing with the geographic realities. Allowing Turkey into the EU would probably help this situation somewhat by giving oil investors a better idea of what the most politically stable route would be. Additionally, since Turkey can stop oil from flowing through the Straits at will, Europe does not have a choice but to acknowledge this fact and work with Turkey. Under current market conditions, though, this highly speculative reason for allowing Turkey into the EU or WEU is far from sufficient to justify such an action and the real concerns would be based more on time to bring new resources to market rather than the non-existence of oil.²⁴⁷

b. Access to Other Markets

Europe's major economic dealings with Central Asia, the Middle East, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus turn primarily on import of energy and export of manufactured goods since these region's economies are often rich although immature. Turkey also has strong interests in dealing with these potentially rich markets and is

²⁴⁶ Lee, Section 16.

²⁴⁷ New energy resources are continuously being proven despite increasing demand. The United States, for example, has a relatively constant level of proven oil reserves for over 40 years despite continuous production in increasing consumption throughout. (25 bbs (billions of barrels) in 1950; 32 in 1960, 30 in 1970, 30 in 1980 and 27 in 1990). World proven reserves, in comparison have gone from 76bbs in 1950 to 908 bbs, a 14-fold increase in the same period. See Section II, Table 1 "Estimated World Crude Oil Reserves Annually as of January 1), Basic Petroleum Data Book.

attempting to gain influence through involvement in multi-national organizations which could prove significant competitors and hindrances to European business and political interests as they mature. Increasing Turkish influence could have the effect of forcing the Europeans to take greater notice of Turkey and become an incentive to let Turkey into the EU and WEU, but this is not happening at the present time.

In the Black Sea region, Turkey is making a strong bid for economic primacy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December 1990, Turkey took the initiative in getting Soviet, Rumanian, Bulgarian representatives to actively consider establishment of an economic cooperation zone. On 3 January 1992, the Black Sea Economic Consortium (BSEC) was formally inaugurated in Istanbul.²⁴⁸ Since then six former Soviet republics have joined, bringing its membership to ten nations with one observer.²⁴⁹ The organization is primarily trade and investment oriented; it is seen by Turkey as a means of increasing its influence in the former Soviet Republics in particular. BSEC is important to Turkey because it is the first major international initiative led by Turkey in over 50 years, and it gives Turkey a better position as a regional economic and possibly as a military power. A strong economic bloc on Europe's eastern boundary could pose a threat to European economic interests unless it is properly addressed either by

²⁴⁸ Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War," Turkey's New Geopolitics From the Balkans to Western China, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), p. 103.

²⁴⁹ BSEC members now include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine with Poland having observer status.

rendering the BSEC impotent or by treating it as a friendly competitor which can be dealt with rationally which appears to be the current path sought by Europe and Turkey.²⁵⁰

At the present time there is little for Europeans to fear from the BSEC since its effectiveness is more potential than actual, largely due to the highly diverse and often antagonistic relationship of its member states towards one another. For Europe, the issue is whether or not it wants to more closely associate with this organization and perhaps shape it to its economic advantage.²⁵¹ At the present time there is no move (or reason) to do so and access to the Black Sea States by European business is usually conducted without regard to the BSEC.

Another organization with which Turkey is affiliated is the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which Turkey would like to see become influential in Central Asia.²⁵² In a "State of the Union" style press conference on 20 January 1996, President Demirel said the BSEC "will help build the bridge between Europe and Asia. We also attach importance to the ECO, which has ten members, including the Central Asian countries, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. We will continue to develop it."²⁵³ The ECO

²⁵⁰ "WEU Eyes Black Sea Region," Turkish Press Review from the Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage on the Internet at <http://www/mfa.gov.tr/> (4 December 1996). This article says that a document prepared jointly by Lale Aytaman of Turkey and John Hunt of Great Britain and unanimously approved by the WEU Parliamentary Assembly said "closer cooperation between Turkey and the WEU on regional problems would be beneficial in terms of overall security, and is an approach that should be encouraged both by governments that regard themselves as concerned and as by the WEU assembly."

²⁵¹ According to the BSEC's Article 6, the BSEC seeks closer ties with other economic organizations "such as the EU," another reason the BSEC as presently organized does not worry Europeans. From Deniz Akadil and Semih Vaner, "Die Türkei und die neue Runde auf dem Balkan," *Europäische Rundschau* (Summer, 1993), pp. 96.

²⁵² ECO members include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" as an associate member.

²⁵³ Suleyman Demirel, "News Conference by President Suleyman Demirel at the Cankaya Mansion--Live," from Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, translation provided by FBIS, (0800 GMT, 20 January 1996).

was established in 1985 with its headquarters in Teheran and aim of promoting "regional cooperation in trade, transportation, communications, tourism, cultural affairs and economic development."²⁵⁴ It perhaps has the potential for greater cohesiveness than the BSEC since the antagonism among its members does not run as deep. The reality for Europeans is that with a headquarters in Teheran, it is an organization that is immediately suspect although the Europeans do not have as great a degree of mistrust of Iran as their American ally. As for the BSEC, there is little reason at present for Europe to be concerned about this organization or desire to enhance or modify it. The ECO does, however, stand as an example of the importance Turkey places on itself as a bridge nation and is clearly part of an overall Turkish strategy to market itself to the west in this role.

Turkish arguments that they enjoy a privileged position which can facilitate Europe trade and influence to the Middle East are weaker than for the Black Sea or Central Asia for several reasons. Primary is geography. While Turkey largely controls land and sea access to the Black Sea and the Central Asian states, Europe enjoys Mediterranean access to Syria, Lebanon and Israel and, through the Suez Canal, with all the other Middle Eastern countries. Should there be rapprochement between Iran and United States there would be a great expansion of European ties to Iran as well. Again, a look at the geography shows that Turkey's argument that it is a key player in any energy transshipment route from Central Asia is largely based on political barriers--it would not be significantly more expensive and it would probably be easier politically, to ship Central Asian oil through Iran than through either Turkey or Russia. Secondary reasons why

²⁵⁴ World Fact Book (1995), p. 492.

Turkey may not have a major claim to a special relationship with the Middle East are the historical and cultural reasons as discussed on pages 35-36.

c. ***Turkish Straits***

Europeans must ask themselves if access to the Turkish Straits is a vital interest. The answer, short of war, is ‘yes’ which, in fact, was what tilted the NATO decision to accept Turkey despite other geo-strategic baggage such as proximity to then-Russian Caucasus, as well as Iran, and Iraq).²⁵⁵ The primary issue with European interest in the Straits is economic boils primarily down to energy shipment through them.

On 1 July 1994, Turkey began to subject the passage of oil tankers in particular and all large vessels in general to restrictions (see Map 3, page 84).²⁵⁶ Turkey has justified this by saying that “[oil tanker shipping] is too risky to be acceptable to the

²⁵⁵ Váli, p. 152.

²⁵⁶ “The Safety of the Turkish Straits,” Turkish Foreign Ministry Press Release, <http://home.imc.net/turkey/releases/050796.htm> (Washington, DC, 7 May 1996).

These restrictions include:

1. vessels longer than 150 meters (164 yards) are advised to take pilot captains and guiding tugs.
2. automatic pilots for navigation are prohibited.
3. ships powered by nuclear energy, or carrying nuclear or other hazardous materials must report to the Turkish Environment Ministry for permission
4. Ship height is limited to 190 feet.
5. New Traffic lanes to be set, new traffic separation schemes (TSS) are implemented
6. No more than a single vessel carrying materials deemed hazardous will be allowed to pass at the same time.
7. All ships must notify Turkish authorities 24 hours in advance of intention to pass through the straits.
8. Ships longer than 200 meters can pass only in daytime.

From “Bosphorus Straits Regulation and Central Asian Oil,” Trade and Environment Database on the Internet at <http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/BOSPORUS.HTM>, (Washington, DC: American University, as of 23 October 1996).

Turkish government and the public" for environmental and public health reasons should there be an accident.²⁵⁷ The country that takes primary issue with this is Russia, but Europeans have a vested interest as well since they receive a lot of the oil that is shipped from Russian ports. Additionally, current Turkish policy effectively represents a tariff on commerce due to the numerous restrictions.

Map 3 shows the Turkish Straits are the only sea shipping route into the Black Sea for Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia as well as the most practical route for oil transshipment from Central Asian States and the Caucasus. Effectively, Turkey has a stranglehold on Russian Black Sea commerce should she insist on forcing a Turkish-Central Asian or Turkish-Caucasian oil pipeline as opposed to the Russian routes.²⁵⁸

The status of the Turkish Straits is an issue in which Europeans have been involved for a long time--mostly to prevent Russian domination. Notable examples of

²⁵⁷ Metin Demirsar, quoting Ahmet Bangoglu, Deputy Director General of Maritime and Aviation Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, "Industry's CU Competitiveness Viewed," from Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, (1 January 1996).

Turkey has a very legitimate concern here. Istanbul has a population of 11,000,000 people that would be affected by an environmental catastrophe in the Straits and the likelihood of disaster has more than a reasonable chance of happening given the amount of shipping that passes through the Straits each year. "By some estimates, as many as 60 ships per day carrying oil and other hazardous materials pass through the straits. On the whole, 45,000 ships of various sizes pass, with an average of 1,350 per day. On average, 5 ships in excess of 80 DWTs (dead weight tons) now pass each day Turkish officials estimate that 60% of the yearly traffic carries hazardous materials such as natural gas, agricultural and other chemicals, oil, nuclear waste and derivatives through the straits. Twenty billion gallons of oil and chemicals pass through the straits each year." Additionally, "The straits contain no less than 4 acute bends, 2 of them in less than 2 kilometers, at a point where the strait is only 700 meters wide. [sic] Between 1988 and 1992 there were 155 collisions in the Bosphorus. In March of 1994, the oil tanker Nassia . . . carrying 19 million gallons of crude oil from Novorssyisk (Russia), suffered 3 of its 10 tanks ruptured, and drifted unguided and burning for nearly a week. The accident resulted in \$1 billion in damages, and the waterway was closed for a week." From "Bosphorus Straits Regulation and Central Asian Oil," Trade and Environment Database on the Internet at <http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/BOSPORUS.HTM>, (Washington, DC: American University, as of 23 October 1996).

²⁵⁸Davit Gunava: "Zurab Zhvania: 'The Black Sea Tragedy Is Our Common Pain,'" in Russian from Tbilisi Svobodnaya Gruziya, from FBIS, (17 July 1996), pp. 1-2.


European embroilment in Straits affairs are the Treaty of London (1841), Crimean War (1854), Russo-Turkish War (1877 when Europe refused to allow Russian domination--Treaty of Saint Stefano) and World War I with and the secret 1915 Constantinople Agreement which would have partitioned the Ottoman Empire and the Straits among Russia, Great Britain, France and eventually, Italy.²⁵⁹ With the creation of the modern Turkish state, the International Straits Commission was created as part of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to determine the international status of the passage. This treaty, which was largely dictated by the victorious allies, confirmed Turkish ownership, but not Turkey's right to control or fortify the passage.²⁶⁰

In 1936, Turkey protested the military restrictions and successfully petitioned the Montreux Commission for permission to remilitarize the Straits. World War II gave new impetus to a rising Soviet Union to reassert herself in the Straits. In 1945, Stalin voiced his desire to take possession of the Turkish forts and control the

²⁵⁹ Ferenc A. Vali, *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 22-29. Note that the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign had a different motive than blocking Russian access to the Straits.

²⁶⁰ "Largely dictated" is not the same as "dictated." When Mustafa Kemal consolidated his control of modern-day Turkey, the Turkish Assembly adopted the "National Pact" which was to revitalize Turkey and guarantee its sovereignty over its vital interests to include the Straits under its article 4. Article 4 also stated that Turkey was willing to negotiate with the allies only so long as Turkish control of the Straits was retained. Since the allies agreed to this (with communist Russia not a participant in the peace process, the Constantinople agreement was conveniently forgotten), they were able to impose what was essentially their agenda on a weak Turkey. From *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, p. 30; and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence*, (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 5.

Map 3: Turkish Straits²⁶¹



²⁶¹ Váli, p. xiv.

Straits. This forced Turkey to look westward for guarantees of her territorial integrity, prompting the United States to promulgate the so-called "Truman Doctrine" on 12 March, 1947. Turkey was admitted into NATO in 1952.

In 1936, Turkey protested the military restrictions and successfully petitioned the Montreux Commission for permission to remilitarize the Straits. World War II gave new impetus to a rising Soviet Union to reassert herself in the Straits. In 1945, Stalin voiced his desire to take possession of the Turkish forts and control the Straits. This forced Turkey to look westward for guarantees of her territorial integrity, prompting the United States to promulgate the so-called "Truman Doctrine" on 12 March, 1947. Turkey was admitted into NATO in 1952.

The year 1991 brought about new opportunities for Turkey. The Soviet Union became the CIS, creating a regional economic, political and military power vacuum. Most important was the economic opportunity. Although Turkey is not a rich state by Western European standards, she is well off and dynamic compared to the nations of the CIS. The result has been an opportunity to use the Straits strategically which Turkey has done willingly and carefully. The result is European and American support of Turkey's increased restrictions on commerce in the Straits despite Russia's efforts to have Turkey revert to the more liberal pre-1994 policy.²⁶²

The advantage for Europeans if Turkey were allowed into the EU is a probable guarantee that their oil and other commerce would get through to Europe--either by ship via the Bosphorus or pipeline through Turkey. The disadvantage concerns issues of

²⁶² Lee states that Turkey's legal basis for modifying the treaty was a successful petition to the International Maritime Organization, which has links to the U.N.

foreign policy. With the present situation Europe already enjoys all the commercial access she needs without experiencing potential military or political negatives. Additionally, with the status quo, Europe has not excluded Russia as a potential energy partner and the possibility continues to exist that, despite Chechnya, a northern pipeline route is developed for Central Asian oil, if not for Caucasian oil.

Given historical Russian animosity towards the Turkish position on the Straits and the fact that Turkey, even without European backing, is operating from a position of strength in the Straits and the Black Sea as a whole, there is more than a little reason for European wariness with respect to arousing Russian jealousies and perhaps animosities.²⁶³ In the dispute with Russia over oil, Turkey, with the Bosphorus, is said to control the “entrance hall” while Russia “holds the house” to Caspian Asia.²⁶⁴ This factor, though, has been more useful in gaining support for oil pipelines transiting Turkey than in gaining closer official ties to the EU and WEU.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ For Russian animosity to Turkish restrictions on Straits commerce, see Lee; Igor Kasatonov, “Kasatonov Interviewed on Retaining Black Sea Fleet,” from Moscow Moskovskaya Pravda in Russian, translation provided by FBIS, (18 October 1995), p. 2; Oleg Myasnikov, “Russia Alleges Ukraine Could Not Afford Black Sea Fleet,” from Sevastopol Flag Rodiny in Russian, translation provided by FBIS, (5 September 1995), p. 3; “Russia: Turkey Blamed for Damaging Bosphorus Ecology,” Moscow Kommersant-Daily in Russian, from FBIS, (22 May 1996), p. 4; and Marcus Hopkins, “Environmental Risks of Oil Transported Through the Bosphorus,” Azergajian International, (Autumn, 1995) from the Internet at <http://www.azer.com/3.3environmental.html>, (as of 23 October 1996).

²⁶⁴ Rubinstein, pp. 5-6.

²⁶⁵ Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995,” Middle East Journal, (Volume 50, No. 3, Summer 1996), p. 355. Aykan says, “If this (Caspian) oil was exported via Turkey, Europe’s dependence on Turkey would make the Europeans more aware of that country’s continuing strategic importance to the West in the post-Cold War era. This awareness should in turn contribute to European approval for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member in the European Union.”

2. Competitiveness

In 1995, Turkey was the EU's 10th largest trading partner doing a total of more than US \$20 billion in trade, all of it non-oil.²⁶⁶ In 1996, expectations are that Turkey will move into seventh place, ahead of Poland and behind Russia.²⁶⁷ John Barham, the primary writer on Turkey for the *Financial Times*, says "International companies cannot afford to ignore Turkey. [sic] It has a young urbanizing population . . . Penetration rates for consumer products ranging from credit cards or washing machines are well below European levels . . . [and] . . . it is located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and central Asia."²⁶⁸ CU reflects this ideology. Turkey has "die dynamischste Wirtschaft der ganzen Region,"--the most dynamic economy in the entire region. From 1989 to 1994 Turkey's increase in GNP was 36.4 percent compared to 6.9 percent for Greece and she has undertaken to greatly reduce government restrictions on international business opportunities within Turkey.²⁶⁹ Additionally, in both 1996 and 1997, she is expected to have a GNP growth of 8.1 percent.²⁷⁰ Presented with this kind of growth and a commitment to reform, the number of foreign firms beginning business operations in Turkey jumped from 100 in 1979, to over 2,000 in 1991 with a corresponding change in capitalization of US \$225 million in 1979 to US \$6 billion in 1992.²⁷¹ In 1986, the

²⁶⁶ Alejandro V. Lorca Corrons and Mehmet Ali Ciftci, "Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area of the European Union: Utopia or Reality?" Turkish Daily News at <http://home.imc.net/turkey/news/e120195.htm>, (1 Dec 1995).

²⁶⁷ David Tonge, "The Honeymoon Quest," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. II.

²⁶⁸ Barham, p. I.

²⁶⁹ Deniz Akadül and Semih Vaner, "Die Türkei und die neue Runde auf dem Balkan," Europäische Rundschau (Summer, 1993), pp. 89. The authors were primarily referring to the Balkan region when they made this remark.

²⁷⁰ John Barham, "A Perpetual State of Quasi-Crisis," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. III.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

Istanbul stock market was opened and today it is the region's most vibrant, encompassing almost all major and medium-sized firms doing business in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia.²⁷²

Despite these significant indicators of success there are severe misgivings about the future of the Turkish economy as well. John Barnam also says:

Growth has averaged just 4 percent between 1990-95, a mediocre performance given population growth of just under 2 percent. Public finances are collapsing - interest payments on the government's debts will probably consume nearly two thirds of revenues next year - and with them the state's ability to provide basic services. Blackouts have become a feature of daily life. [sic] The economy is not creating enough jobs - urban unemployment is worsening, particularly among the young. Society is becoming divided between haves and have-nots and between secularists and Islamists."²⁷³

The implication is that the Turkish economy is not ready for unrestricted trade on the EU model although this is now a moot point given that CU effectively has brought Turkey into the EU as an economic, but non-voting partner.²⁷⁴ Generally, Turkish business looked forward to CU, especially if the textiles, tourism, banking, construction industries and agriculture.²⁷⁵ Automotive and electronics industries were mostly opposed to it.²⁷⁶ Also, larger firms were less fearful than smaller firms which suffered disproportionately from the 5 April 1994 tax rises and contraction of GNP and who have

²⁷² Barham, "Designs on Neighbors," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. VI. This article contains a summary of information pertinent to the stock exchange.

²⁷³ Barham, p. I.

²⁷⁴ Manisali, chapter IV. Professor Manisali is against CU because it obligates Turkey to take domestic and foreign policy actions that are determined by the EU without Turkey having a right to vote on them herself. His article represents an extreme view of CU implications for Turkish sovereignty, but other authors, such as Hiç and Kramer agree with him in spirit if not in vehemence.

²⁷⁵ Hiç, p. 17.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

requested assistance.²⁷⁷ Finally, there seems to be a tacit recognition that the black economy plays a major role in countering the appearance of Turkish economic instability as it may be 30-50 percent of the official economy.²⁷⁸

Due to CU, the problem of Turkish competitiveness is one Europeans and Turks have to deal with immediately, as according to the CU Treaty, Turkey has only five years to meet or have waived, the economic policies of the EU. Europe and Turkey both recognized the costs of compliance would be high as shown by the EU promising US \$3.2 billion in aid over the five year period beginning 1 January 1996, while Turkey expects to lose US \$2.4 billion per year in certain tax revenues.²⁷⁹

Customs Union has created all the de facto economic trappings of Turkish EU membership (minus the right to vote), but the ultimate goal of European leaders with respect to CU remains unclear. While it is true that the CU treaty is a document of great import to Turkey in particular, it is noteworthy that it does not make any promises on EU membership. Significantly, nowhere does the CU Treaty specifically state that the end result of CU is EU membership. Rather, CU "will complete the transitional phase" of the 1963 Ankara Agreement and that CU "represents an important qualitative step, in political and economic terms."²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Hiç, p. 18. To counter small business concerns, the EU is trying to assist with programs to support small and medium enterprises (SEMS). From Tonge, "The Honeymoon Quest," p. II.

²⁷⁸ John Barham, "A Perpetual State of Quasi-Crisis," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. III.

²⁷⁹ Hiç, p. 22. These figures may be dated as Turkey believes total aid will total US \$3.2 billion. From "Economic Changes Following CU," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, <http://www.turkey.org/news/o216p05.htm>, (as of May 1996). Hiç's figures do not include possible gains in tax revenues due to increased trade.

²⁸⁰ "Text of Decision No 1/95 (Customs Union) . . .," Preamble.

3. Population Growth

Germany probably is most cognizant of the Turkey due to the large Turkish expatriate population currently living in Germany.²⁸¹ Originally invited as Gastarbeiter, (guest workers) to work in low-paying, low social position jobs during Germany's 1960s economic miracle, many of them have stayed. Unlike other Gastarbeiter, such as East and South Europeans, they have not assimilated, even after several generations. Part of this is due to their background—they tend to come from among the least-educated and culturally conservative of Turks. A product of this conservatism and backwardness has been the growth of Turkish ghettos where their alienation continues to feed upon itself. Another characteristic of the Turkish Gastarbeiter is the high percentage of Kurds among them, estimated to be around 25 percent. This group came not only for work, but also to escape Turkish persecution. Unfortunately for Turkish prospects for admission to the EU and the WEU, this group in particular, but a significant minority of all Turks in Germany, has carried their old animosities to Germany. Gastarbeiter insularity coupled with ethnic issues has created a disenfranchised group hostile to both Bonn and Ankara, that is willing to demonstrate their dissatisfaction in undemocratic ways. Recent examples include the PKK's threat to murder high German officials, including Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and the more general blocking of Autobahns and other disruptions.²⁸²

²⁸¹ German sources estimate there are 2,014,000 Turks currently living in Germany, from "In Deutschland leben soviele Ausländer wie nie zuvor - Bevölkerungsteil knapp neun Prozent", Deutschland Nachrichten, (New York: German Information Service, 12 April 1996), p. 1.

²⁸² "PKK droht mit Gewalt und Anschlägen - Verschärfte Sicherheitsmaßnahmen", Deutschland Nachrichten (New York: German Information Center), p. 1; "Kurdische Extremisten inszenieren Terror und Gewalt - Politiker fordern umgehende Abschiebungen", Deutschland Nachrichten, (22 March 1996), p. 1.

Another concern of Germany in allowing Turkish full membership in the WEU and EU is the implicit opening up of borders to free immigration. Germans as well as other Europeans see this as a major threat to an already over taxed welfare system as well as a possible cause of upheaval among the already unemployed.. It is feared by Germany and other EU nations that Turkey, with the second largest population in Europe as well as the fastest growing population could overwhelm Western Europe with a flood of immigrants. High population growth per se is not a problem, but Turkey also has a high level of unemployment.²⁸³ Until Turkey's birth and unemployment rates are brought more into line with that of Europe in general, Europeans are highly unlikely to allow Turkey full EU membership and consequently, full partnership in an ESDI.

C. DEMOCRATIC TRADITION: HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW AND THE KURDS

Human rights issues in Turkey are closely tied to the Kurdish problem since most alleged violations involve this minority group. Nonetheless it is also important to speak of European concerns about Turkish adherence to human rights principles separate from the Kurdish issue so as to understand how the dual dynamic of Kurds and human rights interact.

Europeans have two major concerns with Turkish human rights: violations of the rule of law as laid out in the Turkish constitution, and those of agreements already signed between Turkey and European organizations²⁸⁴ The Maastricht Treaty identifies European

²⁸³ Kuniholm, p. 41.

²⁸⁴ Both the CofE and CU agreements include clauses promoting democracy and human rights. The WEU treaty more properly known as the Brussels Treaty which was signed in Paris on 23 October 1954 (Turkey is an Associate Member of the WEU and hence not a signatory to the actual treaty) says in its preamble: “[The High Contracting Parties] Resolved: To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human

concerns most directly when it states in Title V, Article J.1.2 that “the objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be . . . to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”²⁸⁵ It is not Turkey’s stated goals with respect to human rights that Europeans have a problem with, rather it is perceived Turkish non adherence to their own principles.²⁸⁶ Indeed her constitution specifically states “. . . it is the birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an honorable life and to develop his material and spiritual resources under the aegis of national culture, civilization and the rule of law, through the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms set forth in this Constitution in conformity with the requirements of equality and social justice.” Further, “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.”²⁸⁷

rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;” etc. From Western European Union Brussels Treaty on the Internet at gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int/00/Other_International/weu/BASIC/weu1 (23 Oct 1954). The Washington Treaty founding NATO states in its preamble, “The Parties to this Treaty . . . are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” from NATO Handbook, p. 231.

²⁸⁵ The Maastricht Treaty on the Internet at <http://www.cec.lu/en/record/mt/top.html> (1 November 1993).

²⁸⁶ The list articles expressing Turkey’s goals could be endless. See “Turkey: Demirel Coments on Foreign Policy Issues,” Ankara Turkish Daily News in English from FBIS, (15 March 1996); “The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,”; “Interview with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal,” Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at <http://www.turkey.org/news/0216p09.htm>, (as of May 1996); and “Germany: Turkey’s Yilmaz Addresses Konrad-Adenauer Foundation,” Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish by FBIS (2100 GMT, 17 May 1996).

²⁸⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Preamble and Article 2 from the Internet at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/Anayasa/i142.htm>, (1982).

The question, then, is why so many European observers of Turkey question Turkey's human rights actions.²⁸⁸ Primary concern for Europeans lies in part Two (Fundamental Rights and Duties), especially Chapter One, Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Turkish Constitution. A reading between the lines shows clearly that the nation reserves tremendous power at the expense of the individual--even in times that are not what could be described as a "national emergency."²⁸⁹ This produced the situation, as discussed earlier, whereby eight members of the Turkish Parliament were arrested and subsequently stripped of their official status for alleged violations of the constitution in 1994. The European Parliament responded to the arrests by saying that Turkey should "recognize the

²⁸⁸ Books include, Metz, p. 296 (and others); Fuller, pp. 109-110; and Ahmad, pp. 213-227. Articles include: Hiç, pp. 27-34; Kramer, pp. 7-8 and Kuniholm, pp. 44-45.

²⁸⁹ Article 13: Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant Articles of the Constitution. General and specific grounds for restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms shall not conflict with the requirements of the democratic order of society and shall not be imposed for any purpose other than those for which they are prescribed. The general grounds for restriction set forth in this article shall apply for all fundamental rights and freedoms.

Article 14. None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. The sanctions to be applied against those who violate these prohibitions, and those who incite and provoke others to the same shall be determined by law. No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that would grant the right of destroying the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution.

Article 15. In times of war, mobilisation, martial law, or state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms can be partially or entirely suspended, or measures may be taken, to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate the guarantees embodied in the Constitution, provided that obligations under international law are not violated. Even under the circumstances indicated in the first paragraph, the individual's right to life, and the integrity of this material and spiritual entity shall be inviolable except where the death sentence has been decided upon; no one may be compelled to reveal his religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused on account of them; offences and penalties may not be made retroactive, nor may anyone be held guilty until so proven by a court judgement. From Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

right of autonomy of the Kurdish people . . .”²⁹⁰ The heart of this case to both Europeans and Americans is Turkey’s refusal to recognize the Kurds as a legal minority. United States Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman said in response to the arrests and specifically about Turkey and the Kurds, “We also believe that a lasting solution to the problems in the southeast cannot be achieved through purely military means. We believe that non-military civil and social solutions must be pursued . . .”²⁹¹ It also appears that the United States also put pressure on the EU to assist in a multilateral solution through increased pressure for CU since clauses of the CU treaty deal directly with human rights.

The issue of minority rights also affects Turkey’s relationship with the Council of Europe. On 10 November 1994, the Committee of Ministers adopted a Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities based on the Vienna Summit of 9 October 1993.²⁹² Turkey has refused to sign believing that to do so would amount to official recognition of her Kurdish minority population even though the Framework rights involved are individual rights, and not collective or group rights.²⁹³ Turkey’s reticence on this fairly straight forward document only increases European doubts as to Turkey’s real commitment to human rights concerns despite her words to the contrary.

The reason for European interest and condemnation is the scale of suffering. Figures are often in dispute, but Turkish numbers include the following. Between 1984 and 1993, 2,380 civilians and 3,320 security personell were killed by the PKK and there

²⁹⁰ “Ankara Hits Back . . .”

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Anders Ronquist, “The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,” from the Internet at gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/Other_International/csce/HM/1995/ARTICLES/ronquist1.txt, (no date given, as of 20 November 1996).

²⁹³ Ronquist.

were a total of 10,879 “terrorist events.” The same article also reports that schools and teachers were specially targeted and between 1987 and 1993, 253 “educational institutions” were fully or partially burned by the PKK and that 138 teachers and religions personnel were killed or wounded.²⁹⁴

A different report offerin figures on Kurdish suffering, both at government and PKK hands are also staggering, and the numbers are disputed. Approximately 1,000 Kurdish villages were burned, destroyed or evacuated by Turkish forces through 1994 creating 1.4 million evacuees and refugees. The same report also says 11,000 civilians were killed by Turkish forces during the same period and that in 1994 alone, around 350,000 soldiers were deployed against the PKK.²⁹⁵

Victims of Turkey’s internal war since 1994 are also high and the PKK’s ability to keep themselves in the media, often in a positive light, has been excellent. European concerns over Turkish human rights violations extend to law enforcement and the penal system. One source states that between 1991 and 1995 there were “2,000 extrajudicial executions and daily reports of torture during custody.”²⁹⁶ The result of this negative press is shown in polls of European citizens, with fewer than 20 percent rating Turkey “democratic” and over 50 percent saying she was “undemocratic.”²⁹⁷

Turkish dealings with the PKK can only be called repressive.²⁹⁸ It is also true that the Kurdish question remains disturbingly persistent and that Europeans will have to come

²⁹⁴ “PKK: Reality in Turkey . . .”

²⁹⁵ Hepburn, p. C5.

²⁹⁶ Kürkçü, p. 7.

²⁹⁷ See Appendix B, Table B14c.

²⁹⁸ Every story has two sides and this is a clear example. There is no doubt to Europeans that the PKK is a terrorist organization as evidenced by their denouncement in 1993. Neither is the PKK a

to even closer grips with all the problems engendered by the Kurds if they bring Turkey into the EU and WEU.²⁹⁹ What many Europeans forget, however, is that the British Prevention of Terrorism Act “is precisely as draconian as those of the ‘Struggle Against Terrorism Law’ in Turkey.”³⁰⁰

D. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

This is a highly controversial issue which neither Europeans nor Turks seem willing to squarely face. Robert Mauther, a diplomatic correspondent for the EU perhaps stated European reservations most clearly when he wrote, “. . . Turkey [should] look facts in the face on the European issue and [sic] search for other more deep-seated reasons than the ones officially given for Western Europe’s coolness towards Turkey, namely a feeling of cultural and religious incompatibility.”³⁰¹ His implicit assumption is that regardless of what the Turkish Constitution says about Turkey being a secular state, it does not change the fact that 99 percent of Turks believe in Islam just as the majority of Europeans believe in Christianity.³⁰² This is not an issue of extremism--indeed the Turks are considered moderate practitioners of their religion: “Their [Turk’s] religion is an integral part of their culture and significant in an individual’s life primarily as a framework for rites of passage.

synonym for the Kurds and in fact most Kurds have nothing to do with the organization if they can help it (Henze in Fuller, pp. 21-27). PKK terrorists routinely use extortion, torture and other forms of coercion to influence both Kurds and Turks (Germany: PKK Defectors Describe Party Structure). For the official view of the PKK, see PKK: Reality in Turkey and in the World, (Ankara: Gazetecliler Cemiyeti Yayınları, February 1994).

²⁹⁹ Kürkçü, p. 8.

³⁰⁰ Ronnie Marguiles, “Turkey and the European Union,” Middle East Report, (Spring, 1996), p. 27.

³⁰¹ Robert Mauthner, “Misunderstandings Persist,” Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, (20 May 1985), p. IV.

³⁰² Fuller, p. 5. The Turkish Constitution, Article 2 states, in part, “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state. . .” From the Internet at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/Anayasa/i142.htm>.

[sic] Only Western alarmists unfamiliar with the quality and tempo of Turkish life could regard these [daily rituals, ubiquitous prayer chapels, even increased mosque building] as a manifestation of Muslim fundamentalism.”³⁰³ To Mr. Mauther the issue is more benign, but no less important to both Turks and Europeans. “Are the values, ideals and historical perceptions of Turkey and Western Europe sufficiently similar to permit the integration of the two?”³⁰⁴

1. Tolerance and Intolerance

Turkey does tremendous business with the Middle East and North Africa, primarily as an exporter of technology products and as an importer of energy products. Were Turkey to gain full EU membership, Europeans could expect some increased (but unknown) access to Islamic markets through the good offices of Turkey assuming she is also on good terms with the objective nations. This is based on assumptions arising from the “bridge” nation concept, namely that European acceptance of Turkey would be perceived as a positive signal of tolerance and even support of other cultures. It seems likely that Turkish membership in the EU would have this affect on the Turkish Central Asian states more than the Muslim states of the Middle East, but it is also likely that the effects would be minimal. The main reason is that these other nations already participate in the international economy and are no more likely to give a special deal to Europeans because of Turkey than Europeans are to give a special deal to Canada or the United States. If Europeans expect increased benefits due to a demonstration that the EU is not a “Christian club” they are probably incorrect.

³⁰³ ibid.

³⁰⁴ Mauther, p. IV.

2. Export Stability

The main expectation Europeans have should Turkey become a full member of the EU and WEU is the promotion of stability in the countries surrounding Turkey. This would be accomplished through vindication of Atatürk's legacy as well by making Turkey "an important model to those Muslim nations in the Middle East that contemplate what it means to be a secular, democratic republic."³⁰⁵

If Europe takes the opposite path and formally tells Turkey not to expect entrance in the foreseeable future, a possible repercussion is resentment for the short term with problems, possibly major, over the long term. Two major possibilities exist, one of which appears to be happening already. That is increasing Turkish autonomy in foreign and economic policy formulation in opposition to European interests as already discussed. The other is increased Turkish and regional instability based on the assumption that if EU membership could bring about stability, then the opposite action should have the opposite affect. There is clearly an undercurrent of resentment even now (although somewhat ameliorated by CU among pro-EU Turks).³⁰⁶ But if Europe does not answer the door often enough, Turkey may eventually get the message that she is not wanted as an equal partner. Should a sufficient level of dialogue remains in effect, this may not pose an insurmountable problem (i.e., continued benefits of limited EU membership such as customs union as well as loans and grants). If Turkey does not believe that there is

³⁰⁵ Kuniholm, p. 48.

³⁰⁶ Turkey has been disappointed when the European Council of Ministers refused to open negotiations on Turkey's 1987 request for EEC accession until at least 1993, somewhat ameliorating Turkish disappointment by calling for CU by 1995 instead. (Kuniholm, pp. 41-43)

sufficient dialogue, she will be forced to behave in a much more independent nation with negative effects for the EU, the WEU and NATO.³⁰⁷

For the EU and WEU, Turkish bilateralism outside of European constructs means that Turkey may thwart, either intentionally or inadvertently, Europe's ability to export stability to the Middle East, Black Sea nations, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Among problems Europe could expect are reduced access to markets, increased transit fees, undermining of European initiatives in the Turkish sphere of influence and increased immigration from Turkey due to a worsening of the human rights situation there.³⁰⁸

More likely is that Turkey will demonstrate increased autonomy in her sphere of influence by such actions as her leadership in the formation of the BSEC which is an economic arrangement of ten nations—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.³⁰⁹ At the time of its formation, the West, to include Europe in particular, hoped that it would also be a means to funnel aid to the new republics and optimistically influence their democratization, but at a minimum, that it

³⁰⁷ Ronald D. Asmus on page 40 in the chapter "Western Europe" of Strategic Appraisal 1996, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996), edited by Zalmay Khalilzad, believes this has already happened. "The potent combination of radical Islam, trends toward proliferation, and the uncertainty of traditional pro-western pillars, *such as Turkey*, produced enormous strategic uncertainty (for Western Europe)." It is significant that he considers Turkey both in and outside of Europe. On page 44 Asmus says, "While one group of countries led by Germany remains primarily concerned with the East, France, Italy, Spain and Turkey are first and foremost concerned about national security concerns in the South." See, also, Kuniholm, p. 43.

³⁰⁸"Turkey and Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)" from the Internet, (18 May 1996). This assumes that exclusion from the EU and WEU would have an adverse affect on the Turkish economy which would, in turn, worsen population pressures on Turkey's government and economy.

³⁰⁹Ziya Önis, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity," Middle East Journal, (Vol 49, No. 1, Winter, 1995), p. 58.

would create a fertile trade environment with this resource-rich region. Forcing Turkey to be overly independent could deny Europe these potential benefits.

Too much of a slowdown in EU and WEU progress towards membership could also have adverse affects on NATO which appears to have been part of the reason behind American pressure on the EU to attain CU with Turkey. In short, Europe must be absolutely certain not to send too much of a negative signal to Turkey which would in turn cause a spiraling decline in relations to a level significantly poorer than they currently are with strong repercussions in the economic realm.

IV. CONCLUSION

Turkey has had European Union membership as a written goal since 1963, and Western European Union membership as a goal since 1987. Progress has been made, most recently with Customs Union and Associate Member status respectively, but many Turkish leaders are continuing the push for full membership in both organizations as the logical consequence of Kemalism.

Europe also recognizes Turkey's goal of eventual full membership, but is unwilling to make a firm commitment. Europeans do not question that Turkey is extremely important to them. Whether Turkey is important enough to become part of part of the EU and WEU is open for debate.

Many Turkish leaders cite cultural differences as the real basis of European apathy in supporting Turkey's bid for membership. Investigation of the public evidence suggests this may be a factor, but not necessarily the most important one. Other commonly-mentioned reasons include issues of economics and population growth, human rights and foreign policy. CU has served to make economic concerns less important by bringing about all the economic appearances of EU membership. CU has also served to focus attention on the other three European issues and one highlighted a peculiarly Turkish one-sovereignty.

As part of the CU Treaty, Turkey has promised to improve her human rights record, work to find a solution to the Kurdish question, and cooperate on ending the Cyprus and Aegean stand-off with Greece. Many Turks takes issue that this is mandated by an organization in which they do not have full voice, namely, the right to vote. Hence,

Turks see themselves in a situation whereby policy of the 15, including nemesis Greece, is forced on them against their will--even on issues they perceive as mostly internal such as enforcement of Turkish law.

Europeans are likewise saddled with responsibilities arising from CU--especially to ensure it does not fail. Although the CU treaty does not specifically mention future Turkish integration into the EU, it is strongly implied. Further, CU is seen by both sides as a rehearsal of what EU membership would mean for them. Failure of CU, then, would be a failure in several ways. For Turkey, failure would demonstrate to her leaders and people alike that full integration into Europe is a dead-end path. For Europe, failure could diminish the current ties she has to a very important trading partner as well as a strategically-positioned nation.

Europeans and Turks may ask why failure to enter the EU and WEU is important in the first place. The primary reason is stability--within Turkey, the regions surrounding her and even Europe itself. Although Europeans do not overwhelmingly espouse Turkish membership in their most important organizations, they almost universally believe that regional stability, broadly defined to include all of the Eurasian land mass (and Africa), is a vital interest. Exporting stability to Turkey and her neighbors is commonly cited as a major benefit of allowing Turkey into the EU and the WEU. Europeans know this but they do not, from a Turkish perspective, seem to realize that failure to say "yes" to accession often enough begins to sound like "no."

European failure to take a forthright position on Turkish accession is due largely to the size of the organization and the divergent interests of its members. Turkish leaders

seems cognizant of this fact which goes far in understanding 33 years of patience. As Europe “deepens,” though, she is seen as much more monolithic and centralized to outsiders and partial outsiders such as Turkey.

The political and economic consequences for Europe of not allowing Turkey full EU and WEU membership over the near term (5-10 years) are probably quite low. Over the medium and long term adherence to the status quo of having Turkey near, but not in, involves increased risk to Turkish and possibly European stability unless European and Turkish leaders take appropriate actions to accommodate a situation different from each polities’ stated goal of membership.

Many European leaders fail to realize is that their ‘near term’ is Turkey’s ‘present.’ European leaders are still behaving as if bipolar assumptions remain valid--most importantly that Turkey will remain relatively cooperative and supportive regardless of European complacency. The reality is that two key events serve to modify this assumption--the end of the Cold War, and the beginning of the Second Gulf War. Prior to the Second Gulf War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey did not have a great deal of latitude with respect to choosing her allies. The Second Gulf War and the reluctance of NATO’s European allies to honor, without reservation, their Article 5 guarantees indicated to Turkish leaders that they should consider looking further for security guarantees. The end of the Soviet Union enabled them to do this.

The result is that since 1991, Turkey has been much more willing to develop her foreign policy independent of Europe. Forming the BSEC, supporting the ECO, working bilaterally with the United States, and making overtures to neighboring powers, regardless

of their diplomatic status with respect to Europe (and the United States) are demonstrations of this increasing independence. Currently this is not a major problem as Turkey is still willing to explore options with Europe.

There are three options available to Turkey. She can completely renounce the goal of EU and WEU membership and all the treaties and agreements she has signed with the EU and WEU until now. She could continue whole-heartedly to clamor for membership. Or she can do as she is presently doing; that is, maintain a dialogue while pursuing other options simultaneously.

Europeans do not seem to realize that Turkey is, in fact, following a different paradigm of relations since they remain focused on the appearances of closer ties that CU engender. Additionally, the change in the paradigm may not be important now because a true ESDI is still in the future, hence Turkish membership in NATO is sufficient to meet European security needs--with the comfortable knowledge that the United States is also there should there be a situation involving Turkey.

Europe's greatest challenge in not letting Turkey in will be keeping the door open to all the benefits she currently gets from her Turkish dealings. The Black Sea Economic Consortium may not be particularly effective, but when one is aware of what it, the Economic Cooperation Organization and Ozal's, Demeril's, Cillar's and Erbakan's initiatives abroad, one can clearly see a new trend in Turkish foreign policy. This trend of cooperative and friendly overtures by Turkey could help Europe, but it could also be detrimental depending how Turkey chooses to exploit her geographic position in the future. If Turkey is looking abroad because she does not have faith in European

commitments to her, then it seems likely that Europe will suffer some adverse affects as Turkey develops alternate avenues for friendship and economic gain. If, however, Turkey feels she is changing her policy with at least tacit European encouragement freely given by one friendly nation or bloc to another, then Turkish independence should ultimately be to Europe's and Turkey's mutual benefit.

A Turkey partially outside of the EU and the WEU is not necessarily a bad thing so long as both polities know where they stand. The current European policy, though, of ambiguity is perceived by Turks as unfair and ultimately may prove harmful to both Turks and EU members alike. Europe is still taking Turkey for granted based on a 'business as usual' approach. Turkey appears to be exploring other options while keeping the European door as fully open as possible. The EU and WEU members need to realize that there has been a change in Turkish-European relations and that a more profound one could be in the future if Europe does not make her position clear. Essentially, the EU and WEU should either tell Turkey that they only want ties that are as close as possible short of full membership, or they should clearly link the milestones that are included in the CU treaty to future EU and subsequent WEU membership.

Europeans currently enjoy an unlikely situation. Through CU, they have excellent access to the benefits of Turkish EU membership without the responsibility, and through NATO they enjoy an equivalent relationship with the WEU. This state is probably not sustainable as Turkish leaders seek clarification or face the specter of repudiation at home for failure to reach closure. The paradigm of Turkish-European relations has already

changed once and it seems likely it will shift again--the question is one of 'when' rather than 'if.'

Europeans (and Americans) should not expect to be as fortunate when the next shift in Turkish foreign policy occurs. The time to act is now and if Europeans are unwilling to clarify their position on Turkish integration into the EU and WEU, then the United States should be willing to put pressure on the Europeans to do so.

APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATIONS OF WHICH TURKEY IS A MEMBER

Table A1: Organizations of which Turkey is a Member

Organization	Abbreviation	Members
Asian Development Bank	AsDB	40
Bank for International Settlements	BIS	33
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone	BSEC	11
Customs Cooperation Council	CCC	136
Council of Europe	CE	32
Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (observer only)	CERN	19
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	EBRD	59
Economic Commission for Europe	ECE	54
Economic Cooperation Organization	ECO	10
Food and Agriculture Organization	FAO	170
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	GATT	123
International Atomic Energy Association	IAEA	121
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	IBRD	178
International Civil Aviation Organization	ICAO	133
International Chamber of Commerce	ICC	59
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	ICFTU	164
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement	ICRM	161
International Development Association	IDA	157
Islamic Development Bank	IDB	48
International Energy Agency	IEA	23
International Fund for Agricultural Development	IFAD	157
International Finance Corporation	IFC	161
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	IFRCS	151
International Labor Organization	ILO	171
International Monetary Fund	IMF	179
International Maritime Organization	IMO	149
International Maritime Satellite Organization	INMARSAT	75
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization	INTELSAT	134
International Criminal Police Organization	INTERPOL	176
International Olympic Committee	IOC	193
International Organization for Migration (Observer)	IOM	52
International Organization for Standardization	ISO	76
International Telecommunications Union	ITU	134
North Atlantic Cooperation Council	NACC	38
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO	16
Nuclear Energy Agency	NEA	23
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	OECD	25
Organization of the Islamic Conference	OIC	48
Organization on Security and cooperation in Europe	OSCE	53

Organization	Abbreviation	Members
Permanent Court of Arbitration	PCA	80
United Nations	UN	184
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	UNCTAD	184
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	UNESCO	182
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR	47
United Nations Industrial Development Organization	UNIDO	166
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	UNIKOM	33
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	UNRWA	19
Universal Postal Union	UPU	189
Western European Union (Associate Member)	WEU	10
World Federation of Trade Unions	WFTU	116
World Health Organization	WHO	189
World Intellectual Property Organization	WIPO	147
World Meteorological Organization	WMO	147
World Trade Organization	WTO	not given

APPENDIX B: SELECTED STATISTICS ON EUROPEAN VIEWS OF TURKEY

All Statistics are extracts from the Index to International Public Opinion in the edition year indicated.³¹⁰

A: INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY OPINIONS AND TURKEY:

1. Cyprus:

Table B1: Optimism on Finding a Solution to the Cyprus Problem

"How optimistic are you that a viable solution to the Cyprus problem will be found? (pg 184, September 1987, 1987-1988)

	Total %	Refugees %	Non-Refugees %
Very optimistic	5	6	5
Rather optimistic	21	21	20
So/so	25	23	26
Rather pessimistic	30	31	29
Very pessimistic	19	19	20

Table B2: Important Problems for Greek Cypriots

"Which one of the following problems do you consider as the most important? And which one the second most important? (pg 113, September 1987, 1987-1988)

Problem	First	Second	First/Second
	%	%	%
Deadlock on Cyprus Problem	55	10	65
Strengthening of Attila	7	13	20
Insecurity	8	12	20
Youth unemployment	6	14	20
Increase of (Turkish) settlers	6	10	16
Crime/internal security	3	11	14
Tax burden	4	9	13
Partisanship	4	9	13
Lack of meritocracy	2	6	8
State of national defense/national guard	1	4	5
Increase of public debt	1	3	4
Don't know	1	2	1

³¹⁰ Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, editors, Index To International Public Opinion, various successive years 1987 to 1993, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press).

2. France:

Table B3: French Feelings of Sympathy Towards Other Nations

“Do you feel sympathy, antipathy or neither sympathy nor antipathy toward the following countries?” (pgs 211-212, October 1991, 1992-1993)

- A. Sympathy
- B. Antipathy
- C. Neither

Country	1991			Country	1991		
	A %	B %	C %		A %	B %	C %
Belgium	82	1	16	Greece	59	5	32
Canada	82	1	15	Poland	59	8	30
Luxembourg	72	2	24	Austria	58	6	32
Spain	71	5	23	Germany	57	11	29
Italy	71	5	23	Great Britain	57	14	27
Netherlands	70	3	24	Iraq	7	70	20
Sweden	66	2	28	Iran	10	60	26
Portugal	66	5	26	Libya	9	58	28
Switzerland	66	5	27	Syria	10	48	35
Denmark	63	2	31	Cuba	17	44	33
United States	63	9	26	Algeria	22	40	34
Ireland	61	6	29	Turkey	24	32	40
Australia	59	4	32	Lebanon	32	32	31

Table B4: French Opinion on Which Countries are Muslim Fundamentalist

“Can you tell me which, if any, of the following countries are Muslim fundamentalist?”
(pg. 213 October 1991, 1992-1993))

Country	Yes			Don't Know
	%	%	%	
Egypt	33	30	37	
Portugal	3	67	30	
Turkey	39	22	39	
Iraq	75	6	19	
Iran	78	3	19	
Greece	5	64	31	

3. Greece:

Table 5: Issues of Importance to Greeks

"I should like to hear your views on some political issues and problems. Could you please tell me for each issue or problem whether you consider it to be very important or not very important?" (pg 106, November 1988, 1988-1989)

	Very %	Not Very %	Don't Know %
The U.S. bases problem	66	28	6
Unemployment	95	3	2
Stable prices	90	8	2
Greek-Turkish differences	85	12	3
Political unification of the EC	61	34	5
Arms limitation	80	16	4
Restoring educational standards	86	11	3
Agricultural surpluses	73	24	3
Environmental protection	85	12	3
Morality in politics	76	18	6
EC expansion towards Turkey	42	54	4
Realization of the single European market by 1992	64	31	5

Table 6: Should There Be Greek Dialogue with Turkey

"The following two opinions on Greek-Turkish relations have been expressed. Which one do you agree with? (pg. 158, Greater Athens--June 1988, 1988-1989)

	%
We should seek dialogue with Turkey, because only in that way solutions to the problems between the two countries may be found	44
The dialogue with Turkey should continue only if the Turkish troops are withdrawn from Cyprus and Turkey recognizes the international legal status in the Aegean Sea	52
Don't know	4

Table B7: Which Countries Threaten Greece Most?

"Which one of these six countries threatens Greece the most?" (pg 185, Greater Athens--March 1988, 1988-1989)

	1988 %	1987 %	1986 %	1984 %
Turkey	68	81	79	64
United States	19	15	13	28
Albania	2	1	-	1
Soviet Union	1	1	4	5
Bulgaria	1	-	1	-
Yugoslavia	-	1	1	-
Don't Know	9	1	2	2

Table B8: Countries with which Greece Should Have Closest Relations

"With which one (of these countries) should Greece have her closest relations?" (pg 185, Greater Athens--March 1988, 1988-1989)

	1988 %	1987 %	1986 %	1984 %
United States	38	32	44	28
Soviet Union	15	20	24	24
Turkey	15	12	5	3
Bulgaria	9	5	8	12
Yugoslavia	3	5	5	9
Albania	2	4	2	2
All/Don't know	18	22	12	22

Table B9: Most Important Problem Facing Greece

"In your opinion, which one on this card today is the country's most important problem?" (pg. 132, Greater Athens--July 1989, 1989-1990)

	%
Unemployment	34
Environmental protection	24
Inflation	17
Reorganization of the public administration	9
Relations with Turkey	9
Relations with the United States and NATO	3
Energy	2
Don't know	2

4. Great Britain:

Table B10: Should Turkey Be Invited into the EU?

“Do you think Turkey should be invited to join the European Community?” (pg 194, November 1992, 1992-1993)

Answer	%
Yes	39
No	32
Don't know	29

Table B11: Is Turkey Part of Asia or Europe?

“Would you say that Turkey is part of Asia or Europe?” (pg 208, November 1992, 1992-1993)

Answer	%
Asia	46
Europe	31
Don't know	23

Table B12: Is the Turkish Government Democratic?

“Do you know whether the government of Turkey is a democratically elected one like in Western countries, or is it communist, or is it a dictatorship, or some other system?” (pg 208, November 1992, 1992-1993)

Answer	%
Democratically elected	15
Communist	4
Dictatorship	15
Some other system	7
Don't know	59

B. EUROPE AND TURKEY:

Key to Country Abbreviations, "Europe and Turkey"

B	Belgium	E	Spain	NL	Netherlands
DK	Denmark	F	France	P	Portugal
DW	West Germany	IRL	Ireland	UK	United Kingdom
DE	East Germany	I	Italy		
GR	Greece	L	Luxembourg		

Table B13: European Opinions on Turkey

"Let's talk about Turkey and the Turkish people. Please tell me for each of the statements which I'm going to read whether you agree (yes) or disagree (no). (pgs 657-660, Spring 1989, 1988-1989)

Table B14a: Turkey is a Modern Country

Turkey is a modern country	Agree/yes %	Disagree/no %	Don't know %
Europe total	13	67	20
Austria	13	64	23
Denmark	7	81	12
Finland	17	65	19
West Germany	18	68	14
Great Britain	15	61	24
Greece	6	79	15
Ireland	24	45	30
Luxembourg	10	67	23
Netherlands	3	62	35
Norway	11	65	25
Sweden	15	70	15
Switzerland	15	73	12
United States	18	53	29

Table B14b: Turkey Is An Important Partner in Nato

Turkey is an important partner in NATO	Agree/yes	Disagree/no	Don't know
	%	%	%
Europe total	31	31	38
Austria	30	26	44
Denmark	32	36	32
Finland	34	33	33
West Germany	45	28	26
Great Britain	26	31	43
Greece	49	22	29
Ireland	22	23	54
Luxembourg	28	30	42
Netherlands	20	28	52
Norway	30	34	39
Sweden	31	38	31
Switzerland	27	41	32
United States	39	25	36

Table B14c: Turkey is a Democratic Country

Turkey is a democratic country	Agree/yes	Disagree/no	Don't know
	%	%	%
Europe total	14	54	32
Austria	24	40	36
Denmark	9	69	22
Finland	19	51	30
West Germany	22	55	22
Great Britain	14	38	48
Greece	5	72	23
Ireland	24	25	51
Luxembourg	11	50	39
Netherlands	2	58	40
Norway	15	50	35
Sweden	14	67	19
Switzerland	16	65	19
United States	17	42	41

Table B14d: I'd Like to Visit Turkey One of these Days

I'd like to visit Turkey one of these days	Agree/yes %	Disagree/no %	Don't know %
Europe total	51	41	8
Austria	53	39	8
Denmark	48	47	5
Finland	54	41	5
West Germany	56	37	7
Great Britain	41	54	5
Greece	65	31	4
Ireland	42	46	11
Luxembourg	55	42	3
Netherlands	43	32	25
Norway	52	43	5
Sweden	48	47	5
Switzerland	61	32	7
United States	19	78	3

Table B14e: Many Turkish Workers Live in our Country

Many Turkish workers live in our country	Agree/yes %	Disagree/no %	Don't know %
Europe total	76	8	16
Austria	96	1	3
Denmark	97	0	3
Finland	64	14	22
West Germany	97	2	1
Great Britain	66	9	26
Greece	59	16	24
Ireland	38	15	47
Luxembourg	56	16	28
Netherlands	97	3	0
Norway	87	3	10
Sweden	92	3	5
Switzerland	93	4	3
United States	76	5	19

Table B14f: I've Already Gotten to Know Turks

I've already gotten to know Turks	Agree/yes %	Disagree/no %	Don't know %
Europe total	42	54	4
Austria	38	53	9
Denmark	50	49	1
Finland	32	63	5
West Germany	69	28	2
Great Britain	32	63	5
Greece	20	79	1
Ireland	12	80	8
Luxembourg	43	53	4
Netherlands	71	27	2
Norway	31	67	2
Sweden	45	52	3
Switzerland	62	32	6
United States	26	71	3

Table 15: Is Gulf Crisis Support to Allied Embargo Victims a Good or Bad Thing?

"Please tell me whether you find each of the following actions taken by the European Community concerning the Gulf crisis, a good thing or a bad thing?" (pg. 590, Eurobarometer # 33--Spring 1990, 1990-1991)

"Supporting countries which are victims of the embargo: Egypt, Jordan, Turkey"

	B	DK	DW	DE	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
Good Thing	84	80	88	na	58	81	80	83	82	85	88	80	85
Bad Thing	9	10	4	NA	17	11	12	7	12	7	9	12	8
Don't Know	7	10	8	NA	25	8	8	10	6	8	3	8	7

Table B16: How Much Do You Trust in Other Peoples?

"I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust in them, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all. Scores were calculated by applying coefficients of 4, 3, 2, 1 respectively to the various answer codes. "Don't knows" were excluded. Therefore, there was a midpoint of 2.50. Below that level negative answers predominate and above it positive answers." (pg. 552, Eurobarometer # 33--Spring 1990, 1990-1991)

	B	DK	S	GR	RE	T	TR	I	NE	P	UN
Belgium	3.55	3.14	2.89	2.91	2.51	3.17	2.97	2.69	2.90	3.36	2.84
Denmark	3.13	3.54	3.04	2.97	2.51	2.99	2.99	2.73	2.96	3.35	2.77
W. Germany	3.02	3.15	3.59	2.82	2.50	2.86	2.91	2.75	2.77	2.95	2.86
Greece	2.53	2.70	2.59	3.08	2.43	2.51	2.49	2.49	2.59	2.62	2.59
Spain	2.72	2.70	2.77	2.82	3.39	2.76	2.73	2.80	2.77	2.69	2.72
France	3.14	2.98	2.96	2.93	2.32	3.40	2.92	2.89	2.94	2.96	3.03
Ireland	2.87	2.96	2.62	2.78	2.40	2.71	3.53	2.50	2.69	2.93	2.66
Italy	2.55	2.67	2.59	2.52	2.58	2.63	2.67	3.12	2.73	2.60	2.79
Luxembourg	3.52	3.19	3.02	2.90	2.48	3.15	2.97	2.72	3.62	3.39	2.82
Netherlands	3.12	3.29	2.94	2.97	2.64	2.99	3.01	2.78	3.13	3.46	2.83
Portugal	2.57	2.68	2.55	2.62	2.43	2.61	2.67	2.39	2.64	2.76	2.45
United Kingdom	2.85	3.16	2.67	2.65	2.13	2.55	2.77	2.44	2.72	3.07	2.80
Russia	2.29	2.59	2.58	2.59	2.30	2.16	2.47	2.66	2.35	2.69	2.43
Poland	2.68	2.90	2.11	2.43	2.27	2.67	2.75	2.64	2.61	3.01	2.51
Hungary	2.63	2.86	2.56	2.45	2.18	2.61	2.67	2.56	2.55	2.91	2.51
Rumana	2.49	2.63	2.07	2.38	2.23	2.49	2.52	2.44	2.37	2.67	2.47
Czechoslovakia	2.56	2.79	2.31	2.46	2.23	2.57	2.59	2.53	2.50	2.83	2.51
E. Germany	2.57	2.85	2.99	2.55	2.36	2.56	2.66	2.54	2.40	2.72	2.56
Bulgaria	2.43	2.69	2.15	2.04	2.14	2.49	2.56	2.32	2.37	2.68	2.47
Yugoslavia	2.56	2.70	2.29	1.89	2.23	2.52	2.67	2.33	2.44	2.71	2.52
Turkey	1.90	2.29	2.23	1.29	1.81	2.00	2.20	1.87	2.18	2.23	2.42
Switzerland	3.27	3.22	3.23	3.10	2.60	3.03	3.03	2.79	3.06	3.31	2.98
U. S.	3.00	3.05	3.04	2.58	2.15	2.88	3.02	2.93	3.01	3.07	2.87
Japan	2.51	2.90	2.69	2.93	2.43	2.41	2.74	2.81	2.52	2.59	2.63
China	2.02	2.39	1.89	2.41	2.21	2.03	2.40	2.36	2.17	2.09	2.37

Table B17: Which Countries Should Be EC Members in 2000?

"If you had the choice, which countries do you think should be part of the European Community in the year 2000? For each of the countries on this map, please tell me if it should be a member of the European Community in the year 2000 or not? (This table is an extract from the 43 countries in Europe, CEE, and Asia which were asked about). (pgs 620-621, Eurobarometer # 38, Fall 1992, 1992-1993)

	B	DK	DW	DE	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
Germany	90	90	94	93	87	81	89	83	87	91	92	79	79
Cyprus	49	32	35	30	82	45	32	51	45	41	47	42	54
Estonia	42	62	48	55	33	43	35	30	40	40	58	37	39
Greece	81	74	76	78	90	78	76	77	83	79	72	75	39
Hungary	58	50	56	73	63	57	54	59	59	46	64	56	57
Malta	51	49	52	56	67	44	40	53	62	49	61	41	63
Poland	60	58	46	58	53	59	59	60	66	51	65	58	60
Czech Rep.	40	41	42	69	43	49	42	37	49	40	51	41	51
Russia	38	19	32	46	48	48	34	31	44	33	41	48	36
Slovakia	34	32	28	34	30	43	31	23	39	31	45	34	38
Turkey	43	26	43	47	19	44	34	51	40	34	51	53	45

Table B18: Which Countries Should Become EC Membership in the 'Near Future'?

"For each of the following countries, are you in favor or not of them becoming part of the European Community, in the near future?" (pg 626, Eurobarometer # 39--Spring 1993, 1992-1993)

	B	DK	DW	DE	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK
Austria	85	91	84	83	77	69	72	74	75	83	83	63	
Sweden	85	92	84	87	80	73	80	78	78	82	92	67	
Finland	81	90	79	80	75	69	76	74	71	80	88	58	
Norway	82	92	82	82	75	70	78	76	73	82	91	62	
Iceland	75	88	72	65	72	64	71	65	64	76	84	52	
Switzerland	84	90	83	85	80	73	78	78	74	82	88	70	
Malta	55	63	50	48	70	50	44	64	62	54	69	49	
Cyprus	47	51	41	42	83	46	38	60	56	44	59	46	
Turkey	35	39	39	37	11	40	27	54	37	27	50	46	

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